BSOG-171: Society: Images and Reality
Guess Paper-I

Q. How is India as a colony?

Ans. In May 2015, Shashi Tharoor, a former undersecretary general of the United Nations and a current member of India's parliament, gave a stirring speech at a debate in the Oxford Union. He was speaking for the proposition that "Britain owes reparations to her former colonies. " The speech went viral, and Tharoor was perplexed. "Though I had spoken well enough for my side to win the debate by a two-thirds majority, I knew I had made better speeches that had not acquired a tenth of the fan following," Tharoor recalls in his latest book Inglorious Empire: What the British Did to India published in India in late 2016 and the rest of the world in early 2017. "I honestly did not think I had said anything terribly new. "What he may not have realised then is that he had managed to provide not just very succinct and persuasive arguments against the empire but also quantify the scale of its ills. Following which, in a world where nearly two-thirds of Britons believe that the empire was "something to be proud of" and where many Indians seem to think that its overall effect on their country may have been positive, Tharoor felt he could not turn down the "moral urgency of explaining why colonialism was the horror it turned out to be. "The speech, thus, evolved into Inglorious Empire, in which Tharoor dissects most of the arguments made by apologists for the empire with hard facts and deft writing. On India's 70th Independence Day, we have selected four of those arguments to remind the world of the cruelty unleashed by British greed. For a detailed read, we highly recommend Tharoor's book.

Without British rule, there wouldn't have been a political union called India: The East India Company was created in 1600 to cash in on trading with India, which at the time accounted for more than a quarter of all the trade in the world. It soon realised, however, that its ambitions would be better served with a permanent presence in the country, and from then on the trade took off. As the company's men grew prosperous, they began dreaming of expanding their territory and found little opposition. In some 100 or so years, through a series of conquests and some clever politicking, the company created a rival empire on the subcontinent among the already warring ones (such as the Maratha, Mughal, and Awadh regimes). Today, the argument goes that, had it not been for the British, those rival factions would not have coalesced into a single entity. This argument stands on two pillars. First, that the British created the idea of a political union called India. Second, that they provided Indians the tools and institutions needed to hold the union together and run it. The first one falls when you consider history. Indian epics, such as the Ramayana, which culminates in prince Ram's battle with the demon-king of Lanka, describe India as a single cultural entity. Even in reality, under emperor Ashoka, about 300 BCE, large parts of the subcontinent enjoyed cultural and administrative unity. When people of the region traveled to foreign lands, like those performing the Haj, the hosts considered the travelers, regardless of their religion, to be "Hindi"—Hind being the Persian/Arabic name for River Sindhu or Indus. The second pillar collapses when you consider what the British did to India. In their entire 200-year rule, they made up no more than 0. 05% of the population. And, yet, for most of that period, no Indian was allowed to join the Indian Civil Service, in part

IGNOURESULTS.COM

because the British could not bear to take orders from a brown man. When they were finally admitted, more direct racism was in store. High scorers in the civil service examinations were accused of cheating, for how else could brown men do so well. The few who survived the cheating charge, then faced discrimination back home by being barred from the gentlemen's clubs of the districts they governed. In fact, Britain's policy was not to unite but to divide and rule. Under the British, Tharoor shows that, the Hindu caste system became more rigid, and communal lines, particularly those between Hindus and Muslims, deepened. Nowhere was the application of that singular ethos clearer than when, on their way out, the colonialists partitioned the subcontinent into India and Pakistan.

The British gave India democracy, a free press, and the rule of law: "However strongly they denied to Indians, as they had to Americans before 1776, 'the rights of Englishmen'—the British did instill sufficient dose of the ethos of democracy into their former colonies that it outlived their tutelage," Tharoor writes. "But the actual history of British rule does not suggest this was either policy or practice. "A democracy cannot function without a free press and just law. Neither truly existed under the Raj. The British were the first to establish newspapers in India, catering to a small English-educated elite first, and large audiences in the vernacular languages later. However, alarmed by their proliferation, the East Indian Company passed the Censorship of the Press Act in 1799, subjecting all newspapers to scrutiny before publication. In 1807, all other kinds of publication, too, were brought under this rule. Once bitten by the bug and with strict adherence to the law not being insisted on over time, Indians continued with the enterprise. By 1875, there were some 475 newspapers in the subcontinent, mostly owned and edited by Indians. Alarm bells rang again, bringing another round of censorship in the form of the Vernacular Press Act of 1878 and the revised Press Act of 1910. Under the latter, publishers were required to provide a hefty security deposit, which they would forfeit if the publication carried inflammatory or abusive articles. The racism of the British-owned press was not subject to the same restrictions. "The press was free, but some newspapers were freer than others," Tharoor concludes. The justice system in India was even more discriminatory. For instance, an Englishman who shot dead his Indian servant got six months in jail and a modest fine. But an Indian convicted of the attempted rape of an Englishwoman was sentenced to 20 years. "The death of an Indian at British hands was always an accident, and that of a Briton because of an Indian's actions always a capital crime," Tharoor writes. "The imperial system of law was, pure and simple, an instrument of colonial control. "Worse still, the legacy of the British legal system has left India with an unenviable judicial backlog. There are still cases pending that were filed during the days of the Raj. "The court system, the penal code, the respect for jurisprudence, and the value system of justice—even if they were not applied fairly to Indians in the colonial era—are all worthy legacies," Tharoor writes. "But in the process Britain has saddled us with an adversarial legal system, excessively bogged down in procedural formalities, which is far removed from India's traditional systems of justice. "Indeed, if a pluralist democracy were a British legacy, how is it that neither Pakistan nor Bangladesh have pulled off a similar feat?

British rule was no better or worse than the despots of earlier empires: Few kings ever rule to benefit their people. And, yet, what the British did to India was decidedly worse. Consider, for instance, India's famines during the Raj: Between 1770 and 1947, the oppressed suffered at least 11 major ones and many minor ones, resulting in 35 million deaths. For comparison, Stalin's purge killed 25 million, Mao's Cultural Revolution killed 45 million, and

IGNOURESULTS.COM

World War II killed 55 million. How can we be sure that the British were to blame for those hunger deaths? Simple. There's been no major famine in India since independence. Worse still, the British notion at the time was that governmental interference to prevent a famine was a bad idea. The Economist, for instance, attacked an official for letting Indians think "it is the duty of the government to keep them alive. " (The Canadian author, Malcolm Gladwell, has a great episode of his podcast Revisionist History looking at how the worst Indian famine, between 1943 and 1945, was precipitated by British prime minister Winston Churchill.)The empire's record of forced migration is no better. On one route, between Kolkata to Trinidad, the proportion of deaths of indentured labourers on ships reached appalling levels: 12. 5% of all males, 18. 5% of females, 28% of boys, 36% of girls, and 55% of infants. "To make an admittedly invidious comparison, the death of slaves on the notorious 'Middle Passage' [the Atlantic slave trade route] was estimated at 12. 5%" writes Tharoor. "To be an indentured Indian labourer was to enter a life-and-death lottery in which your chances of survival were significantly worse than those of a shackled African slave. "Finally, there's the infamous Jallianwala Bagh massacre. If you were to believe official figures, the British troops fired 1,650 bullets at innocent civilians, killing 379 and wounding 1,137. "Barely a bullet was wasted, Dyer noted with satisfaction," Tharoor writes. Those who were killed had no idea that suddenly their gathering was suddenly deemed illegal and they received no warning to disperse. Worse still, Dyer was only found guilty of "grave error" and relieved of his command to retire with a handsome pension. Rudyard Kipling, winner of the Nobel Prize in literature, hailed him as "The Man Who Saved India. " Britons ran a public campaign to honour his cruelty and gave him the equivalent of £250,000 in today's money (about $325,000). The victims of the massacre received £1,500 in today's money for each human life. "It was no longer possible to claim that Dyer did not represent the British in India," Tharoor writes. "They had claimed him as one of their own—their saviour. " Surely, though, you can't deny that the British gave us railways, tea, cricket, and the English languageYes they did, but as you've guessed the theme, they were all unintended gifts. Railways. The British built the railways primarily for themselves, using their own technology and forcing Indians to buy British equipment. Each mile of the Indian railway constructed cost nine times as much as the same in the US, and twice that in difficult and less populated Canada and Australia. The bills were footed by Indian taxpayers and British investors received a guaranteed return on their capital. Freight charges were dirt cheap, and Indians who traveled 3rd class paid for expensive tickets. Tea. The British desire to end their dependence on Chinese tea prompted them to set up plantations in India. Following many failed attempts, they managed to find a local version that worked. For this, the British felled vast forests, stripped the tribals who lived there of their rights, and then paid Indian labourers poorly to cultivate the cleared areas. Once the tea was ready, it was shipped off to Britain or sold internationally. The little bit left in India was too expensive, until the Great Depression when weak global demand finally let Indians enjoy the delights of the drink. Cricket. "Yes, the British brought it to us," Tharoor writes. "But they did not do so in the expectation that we would defeat them one day at their own game, or that our film-makers would win an Oscar nomination for an improbable tale about a motley bunch of illiterate villagers besting their colonial overlords at a fictional 19th-century match (Lagaan, 2001). "English language. The British made it absolutely clear that it was only taught to serve their own purpose. Lord Macaulay wrote: "We must do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons Indians in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinion, in morals, and in intellect. " (This is the same

IGNOURESULTS.COM

Macaulay who also said, “A single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia. ”)“That Indians seized the English language and turned it into an instrument for our own liberation was to their credit, not by British design,” Tharoor writes. The upshot of the empire, as Tharoor puts it, was that “What had once been one of the richest and most industrialised economies of the world, which together with China accounted for almost 75% of world industrial output in 1750, had been reduced by the depredations of imperial rule to one of the poorest, most backward, illiterate and diseased societies on Earth by the time of independence in 1947. ”Inglorious Empire shows in full glory how the British systematically purged India’s riches, destroyed its institutions, and created divisions among its peoples. Worse still, there has been no formal apology for what the empire wreaked on its subjects. Instead, there is rising nostalgia for the empire as nationalism surges in a country that is now three ranks below India in the size of its economy.

Q. How does the Indian system of class and power create inequality?

Ans. Social inequality means exclusion. Patterns of unequal access to social resources are commonly called social inequality. It is a differential access to wealth, power, and prestige. Social inequality may exist on gender, race, age, ethnicity, religion, and kinship. By way of hegemony inequality may be sustained for longer periods. Hegemony is the domination of culture by one particular cultural group, resulting in the empowerment of certain cultural beliefs, values, and practices over others. Marx and Engels argued that the real basis of social and political inequality was property, and that since there was no private property in primitive societies, there was no state and no class or inequality. Inequality has become a permanent feature of rank and stratified societies. A stratification system where cultural or racial differences are used as the basis for ascribing status has been the caste system practiced in India. Castes are named, territorially delimited, and membership is determined by birth and unchanging. Caste is a rigid system of occupationally specialized, interdependent groups and has remained a fundamental social institution in India. The Caste system has been the main features of the Hindu societies, however, Muslims and Sikh communities also maintained a certain caste system despite departure from the Hindu philosophies and practices. Castes are ranked by purity and pollution customs, which used to organize political, economic and ritual life Changes in educational attainment influenced inequality in India both favorably and unfavorably. In addition, changes in fertility can also contribute to inequality (Pieters, 2009). The natural source of inequality in terms of age, sex, mental and physical conditions cannot be changed or altered. However, inequality is not expressed in those terms. During the course of development people get classified into different classes and as a process of stratification amidst differences in status, power, income and wealth inequality is produced within the core of the society. Inequality has been regarded as a source of social conflict, tensions that may lead to decline of control, fall of order and values further leading to full or partial or temporary or permanent social disorganization. Social inequality is the existence of unequal opportunities and rewards for different social positions or statuses within a group or society (Moffitt, 2017). Social inequality occurs when resources in a given society are distributed unevenly, typically through norms of allocation, that engender specific patterns along the lines of socially defined categories of persons (Wikipedia, 2017). Social inequality refers to the ways in which socially-defined categories of persons (according to characteristics such as gender, age, ‘class’ and ethnicity) are differentially positioned with regard to access to a variety of social ‘goods’, such as the labour

IGNOURESULTS.COM

market and other sources of income, the education and healthcare systems, and forms of political representation and participation (Walker, 2007). Basically, there are five types of social inequality such as political inequality, income and wealth inequalities, life inequality, inequality of treatment and responsibility, and inequality of membership (Farooq, 2015). Equality and inequality are not opposites; that equality is simply the zero point of the infinite range of inequality. The existence of inequality depends on socially recognized difference. The difference may often be simply a basis for socially imposed inequalities, as with ethnicity and gender, or it may be a real cause of inequality as with health differences (Blackburn, 1991). Social inequality is an area withinsociology that focuses on the distribution of goods and burdens in society (UIO, 2011). Materials and Methods: There are multiple methods of measuring inequality in different areas and different levels. Several secondary data sources have been used in this study to draw inferences. Some data sources are the National Sample Survey (NSS) data, OXFAM, National Family Health Survey, and DevelopmentEducational Indexes. In addition, I have more and more relied on literature reviews, especially related to the quantum and theories of inequality. There have been certain international studies on regional inequalities in India in different areas and all such reports helped to a great extent. Results: There are various manifestations of social inequality. Poverty, deprivation, and gender gap are some of the manifestations in India. Since the economic liberalization in the early 1990s, the evidence suggests increasing inequality (in both spatial and vertical terms) as well as persistent poverty (Ghost, 2007). There has been widening over-time inequality in the distribution of consumption expenditure, which is at odds with the impression of more or less unchanging inequality conveyed in some of the literature available on the subject in India (Jayaraj, 2014). Regional disparities increased in the 1990s, with the southern and western regions doing much better than the northern and eastern regions. Economic inequality also increased within states, especially within urban areas, and between urban and rural areas (Dreze, 2002). All those five categories of social inequalities persisted in India to an extent, however, inequality in terms of income and distribution of income and resources or wealth is a major problem in India. The income inequality in Indian has been complimented due to inheritance, the system of private property, difference in natural qualities, acquired talent, family influence and destiny also (Seth, 2016). Large scale social inequality persisted in various terms even after almost 70 years of elapse of the colonial and feudal structures and democratization. Making a journey towards a welfare, democratic, and modern state India had abolished the Jamindari System however, that's not served the purpose of bringing social equality in India. At the time of independence there were very few industries and capitalists, however, at later stage large resources were accumulated by industries and capitalists. To make thing further worse international development initiatives and globalization also contributed social inequality by removing the barriers to open markets and the free flow of capital. Even welfare and democratic governments in India also became part of those international development initiatives and the process of globalization and further contributed to social inequality. Government extra created their role and minimized the role of the respective society and community. Government almost became guarantor and contributor to the process of globalization, even without any application of mind considering that market forces would promote the economy, and the with developmental initiatives, especially in education, health, infrastructure, communication, and promoting social welfare by way of insurance, pension, unemployment benefits, student loans, soft loans to farmers they would establish equality in the society. However, the same could not be the case. A large scale difference persisted in respective

IGNOURESULTS.COM

compensations in a formal and the informal sector. People working in the informal sector received much less compensation, salary, or wages in comparison to the government and industries. Even within the government sector major discrepancies persisted in terms of contract and permanent employees, especially, in salary and other benefits. Under the influence of internal development efforts large scale employees were recruited on contractual basis in the government sector in the field of education, health, and other sectors and paid comparatively less to the permanent employees despite having similar qualifications and terms of works or duties. People working in industries and market were comparatively better compensated in comparison to the informal sector. In fact, it can be said that the large informal sector in the country has been made under privileged social groups and taking the loads of government expenditures and the globalized economy. An economy within an economy was created by the policies of the government and that further sustained due to globalization and international development initiatives. The large structures of the government, industries, and market were not integrated with the larger social problems and objectives. Societies were deprived to sustain their values, philosophy, culture, and solidarity. The government repeatedly talked about the principles of inclusive growth, however, acted opposite to it. The government was having main role, such as to provide external and internal security, social welfare, justice, and connectivity, however, it created its role unwisely in many areas. Due to various provisions of the government acting unwisely and without application of mind various social groups most often came in direct conflict with those provisions and even a large scale of social tensions persisted among different social groups due to adverse policies adopted and propagated by the government, industries, and market. There were several levels of inequality in the country, ranging from individual to social, local to regional and national to global. Even there was wide social inequality within a particular social group and also between one social groups to another. Any process of development or globalization cannot superimposed from outside, however, any need for development as natural process must start from within the society. Therefore, the respective values, philosophy, culture, and solidarity of the society or community cannot be set aside or compromised considering it as a barrier. The education system also needed to complement those social values, philosophy, culture, and solidarity. Any development would be meaning leas if it would not address the core social problem and objectives. The individual developmental objectives must coincide with the social objectives. However, amidst governmental and globalization, individual objectives were distinguished from the social objectives. In this manner a member of the society started fulfilling the objectives of other societies and nations, whereas his or her own society remained undeveloped. There is a large scale variations in the amount of compensation paid to formal and informal sector. Even variations persisted in terms of industries, markets, national and international terms. If an e-tutor of India teaches students in the United Kingdom he is paid in Indian rates, whereas, if a foreign national serves in India through different structures of multinational or UN agencies they are paid as per the rates of their own country. Such variations in compensations by the industries and international agencies are one of the major causes of social inequality.

Every complex society faces the difficult task of placing its members into roles that are necessary for the society to survive. These roles must be filled with as little conflict and confusion as possible. There must be people willing to perform jobs (roles) with little status and those that carry a great deal of prestige. In your community there are people who are doctors, lawyers, and teachers. Others collect trash, direct traffic, and put out fires. Although these roles do not all

IGNOURESULTS.COM

carry the same prestige, there is very little conflict involved in determining who will perform which one. Consider roles as a deck of cards. You and I will be dealt numerous role cards in our lifetime. In fact, we are playing several roles at any given time. Right now you have been dealt a student role card to play, but you also have other role cards in your hand, such as friend, son or daughter, basketball player, cheerleader, clerk in a drugstore, etc. Many of your role cards came as a result of your birth, age, or gender. Other cards you have earned, such as honor student or basketball captain. In India, caste is one set of role cards and perhaps the most important one. One's caste is ascribed; that is, children inherit the status and functions of their parents. At birth Indians are dealt their caste card. This is alien to what many people in the United States believe about the "good society. " Our parents, relatives, teachers, and friends tell us in a thousand ways that what we make of our lives depends on our efforts, and many of us think all societies should play by the same rules, or at least strive to do so. But it is important to remember that there is no society where individual effort is the sole criterion for status. While caste is a very important set of role cards, Indians, like Americans, also use class (economic) cards. Both caste and class operate at the same time. A person of very low caste such as a sweeper may get a good job that has nothing to do with sweeping and save some money. With this wealth the sweeper may build a fancy house and educate his children who then become doctors, lawyers, and government leaders. This type of role is usually achieved, although some people inherit their wealth.

There is also the possibility of achieving political power in India quite apart from class or caste status. A low caste person might be very good at winning elections and become a member of the central government. Jagjivan Ram, a member of one of the Dalit (ex- Untouchable) castes, has held many cabinet posts in his political career. This system of gaining status is based on power. Power is usually achieved status rather than a role that is dealt at birth. People in India participate in the caste game, the class game, and the power game. In India, castes are ranked, and caste members in a specific geographical area can identify those cases that are above and below them. The ranking of castes is based on purity and pollution, often associated with functions of the human body. Roles associated with the head such as thinking, talking, teaching, and learning are considered pure. Activities associated with waste, feet, and skin are considered polluting. Consequently, Brahmins at the top of the purity scale were scholars who traditionally taught and presided at religious functions. Untouchables, at the bottom of the scale, cleared away human waste, collected garbage, cut hair, skinned animals, and washed clothes. Because their occupations mainly dealt with human, animal, and societal waste, society believed that contact with an Untouchable was highly polluting. Preparing and sharing of food reveals how castes are ranked. Food cooked in oil and prepared by a Brahmin can be accepted and eaten by any caste below it. Food cooked in water can generally be accepted by one's own caste members or inferior castes. Leftover, uneaten food almost always is taken only by the very low castes. Food that can be eaten raw is the most freely distributed and can be accepted by any caste from any caste. In addition, prasad, blessed food that is left over from religious offerings, is given to anyone regardless of caste. There is also a range of pure and impure foods. Vegetables and grains are purer than meat and eggs. Fish is the purest of the non-vegetarian foods, followed by chicken, goats, pork, and water buffalo; the most impure is beef. Sweet pastries, fried in deep fat, are among the most widely acceptable foods from any caste. By observing how food is prepared and with whom it is shared, one can begin to determine the ranking on a purity-pollution scale of the caste groups involved.

IGNOURESULTS.COM

Q. Explain urban India?

Ans. How much of India is actually urban? That is the question the economic survey by the finance ministry has raised this year. The honest answer to that question is: it depends. It depends on the criteria we use to define urban settlements. Under the rather stringent definition of the Census, about a third of India is urban, with urbanized states concentrated in relatively richer southern and western India. But if you believe in what images from satellites tell us about built-up areas, a whopping 63% of India is urban, with urban settlements concentrated in the relatively poorer northern belt. India's three-tiered census definition of 'urban'—at least 5,000 inhabitants, density of 400 people per sq. km or more, and at least 75% of male working population engaged in non-farm activities—was first framed in 1961 by then census commissioner Asok Mitra. "The problem he was trying to solve was that the Gangetic plain is a particularly high-density belt," says Chinmay Tumbe, an economic historian at the Indian Institute of Management-Ahmedabad. Using just a population or density parameter would have inflated the urban rate, skewing funding priorities away from rural schemes. However, more than five decades later, questions are being raised on whether that definition underestimates the urban population although there is no agreement among urban experts on what the new definition should be. Under the census definition, 31% of the Indian population lived in urban areas in 2011. But the share of urban population which lives in towns and cities, actually classified as urban, and governed by urban local bodies is even lower at 26%. Even if one were to discount the satellite data, just relaxing the census definition, and considering settlements with more than 5,000 inhabitants as urban will raise the share of the urban population to 47%. One way to check whether a definition of urban is appropriate is to evaluate the correlation between the share of urban population and per-capita incomes. The built-up area criterion (as measured by satellite images) fails that check. But both the existing definition and the more relaxed (5,000+ inhabitants) criteria seem to meet that test. Regardless of the definition being used, there is an element of discretion involved in any definition that attempts to strictly delineate rural from urban areas. While experts may disagree on the precise definition of 'urban', they all agree that it makes sense to view the entire spectrum of settlements—from small villages to large urban agglomerations—as a continuum rather than in terms of the rural/urban binary. Even Census definitions reflect this continuum as they account for different types of settlements. Much of India's population currently resides in the middle space, away from the big cities as well as the hamlets. Many large settlements that are deemed by the Census and state governments as rural may require urban services such as spatial planning, fire services, and building regulations. But the rigid rural-urban division means that they are denied such services. Also as Tumbe points out, the definition we use will only affect the level of urbanization. It will not affect the pace of urbanization much, which in his view has been low historically because India's rural-urban migration has been driven mostly by male migrants, who go back to their villages instead of settling in cities with their families. The slow pace of rural-urban migration could be because of political incentives, argued India's former chief statistician Pronab Sen in Mint some timeago "In a country where political success is driven by managing the 3Cs of Indian society—caste, community and class—no incumbent political leader would like to see any uncontrolled change in the social configuration of the constituency and, therefore, of the winning coalition," wrote Sen. "Migration causes this both in the originating villages and destination towns. Initially these effects may be relatively small, but they can snowball over time since much of the migration is driven by social networks. "It is perhaps because of these reasons that much of urban growth in

IGNOURESULTS.COM

India is because of purely 'organic' reasons: natural growth and reclassification of towns and villages. Migration accounts for barely a fifth of the urban population growth in India.

Background: Urban slums are characterized by unique challenging living conditions, which increase their inhabitants' vulnerability to specific health conditions. The identification and prioritization of the key health issues occurring in these settings is essential for the development of programmes that aim to enhance the health of local slum communities effectively. As such, the present study sought to identify and prioritise the key health issues occurring in urban slums, with a focus on the perceptions of health professionals and community workers, in the rapidly growing city of Bangalore, India.

Methods: The study followed a two-phased mixed methods design. During Phase I of the study, a total of 60 health conditions belonging to four major categories: -

- non-communicable diseases;
- infectious diseases;
- maternal and women's reproductive health; and
- child health

were identified through a systematic literature review and semi-structured interviews conducted with health professionals and other relevant stakeholders with experience working with urban slum communities in Bangalore. In Phase II, the health issues were prioritised based on four criteria through a consensus workshop conducted in Bangalore. The top health issues prioritized during the workshop were: diabetes and hypertension (non-communicable diseases category), dengue fever (infectious diseases category), malnutrition and anaemia (child health, and maternal and women's reproductive health categories). Diarrhoea was also selected as a top priority in children. These health issues were in line with national and international reports that listed them as top causes of mortality and major contributors to the burden of diseases in India.

Conclusions: The results of this study will be used to inform the development of technologies and the design of interventions to improve the health outcomes of local communities. Identification of priority health issues in the slums of other regions of India, and in other low and lower middle-income countries, is recommended.

Background: While rapid urbanization is emerging as a major challenge globally, the population of urban poor is expected to grow worldwide. Over 800 million people are thought to live in urban slums at present globally, with an estimation to double in the next 30 years. In India, the urban population is expected to grow rapidly from a third to half of its total population by 2030, with a simultaneous expansion of its population of urban poor. Within this wider context, Bangalore is a rapidly expanding and developing city that is situated in the southern Indian state of Karnataka, and attracts a large number of migrants from surrounding rural areas. While the Karnataka State Slum Development Board recognizes approximately 600 urban slum areas in Bangalore, informal estimates indicate that there may be up to 1600–2000 slums in the city (pers comms.). This includes non-notified slums, which are not recognized formally by the government, and lack many vital services, facilities and amenities. Urban slums are characterized by poverty, housing of poor structural integrity, overcrowding, poor access to water, sanitation and other facilities, and challenging living conditions overall, which impact their inhabitants directly and indirectly. All these factors work in concert to create a unique set of challenges that compromise the health of slum communities. This is illustrated by the fact that urban slum communities often have poorer health outcomes than those in neighbouring

IGNOURESULTS.COM

urban areas, and even rural areas. The complexity of this situation is exacerbated by the diversity and fluidity of urban slum settings, and given the interplay between the physical and environmental features of slum systems and local socio-cultural contexts, slum communities tend to be particularly vulnerable to a range of health issues, many of which are largely preventable. However, slum-based patients have relatively poor access to care, and only tend to come into contact with formal health care services relatively late into their illnesses, if at all. Further, there is a scarcity of information available as to the priority health issues that exist, and are likely to emerge, in these settings, making efforts to prevent, screen for, diagnose and treat the health issues of urban slum communities immensely challenging. Addressing the health challenges of urban slum communities is becoming an increasingly important consideration in global health. A crucial first step in addressing the needs of these vulnerable communities is to identify, explore, understand and prioritise the major priority health issues they are facing. The present study seeks to identify and prioritise health issues in urban slums in Bangalore, with a wider view of urban slums elsewhere in India, through an exploration of literature and interviews with key stakeholders who work closely with slum communities. The findings of this study are used to develop a mobile diagnostic and screening toolkit that will help to detect and address the major health challenges in these communities more effectively.

Methods: A two-phased mixed methods design was used in the present study. The aim of Phase I of the study was to identify the health issues reported from urban slums through a systematic literature review and semi-structured interviews with health professionals, community workers and other relevant stakeholders, while Phase II involved the prioritization of these health issues through a consensus workshop. In addition to the data extracted from the literature and interviews, data gathered from a community health centre situated in a slum area in Bangalore and a community consultation activity were used to gain additional insights to complement and enrich the findings of the literature review and interviews. summarizes the study design.

Study design

Phase I

Systematic literature review: A systematic literature search was performed to identify publications that focus on health issues in urban slums in India. The databases Pubmed, Embase, Cinahl, Cochrane and Google Scholar were searched for records up to August 2016 using the following terms: health, disease, healthcare and health problems combined in all possible configurations with the terms slums, urban slums and poverty areas. Two researchers (AW and SA) screened and scored the initial set of titles retrieved based on pre-defined inclusion and exclusion criteria independently. At the beginning of the search, studies from any location were included if they focused on health issues in urban slum setting, so as to get a general overview of the various health issues that exist in the urban slums globally. However, studies were only included in the final analysis if they focused specifically on health issues in urban slum settings in India. Articles that focused exclusively on rural slums, had a veterinary focus, were not written in English, were duplicated, or focussed exclusively on risk factors were excluded. Articles were assigned a score of 0 points if they failed to meet the inclusion criteria, 1 point if they met the criteria partially, and 2 points when they met the inclusion criteria fully. The scores of both researchers were summed and titles scoring a total of two or more points in the first round were examined during the screening of abstracts. When no abstract could be retrieved, the title was scored again. The scores of both researchers were added, and when the

IGNOURESULTS.COM

total score equalled two or more, the publication was selected for full text analysis. Relevant information, including the health issues mentioned, the specific geographic focus, the target demographic, the study design and the sample size, were extracted from the text. Quality assessment of the publications retrieved was outside the scope of the present study. Cohen's Kappa was calculated to determine the level of agreement between the two reviewers in the title and abstract assessments.

Semi-structured interviews: Semi-structured interviews were conducted to gain insight into the health issues in urban slums with a specific focus on the city of Bangalore. Relevant stakeholders with experience working with urban slum communities in Bangalore, including health professionals and community health workers, were recruited through a snowball sampling strategy. The objectives and procedures of the interviews were described via an e-mail invitation to potential participants. The interviews were conducted via video conference at a time convenient to the participant, and with the aid of a semi-structured interview topic guide. Interviews were conducted on an individual basis, or in small groups, depending on the availability and preferences of participants. The interviews lasted approximately 30–45 min. All participants provided verbal consent prior to the interviews and were given assurances about the maintenance of their anonymity and data confidentiality. All interviews were audio-recorded and summarised following each discussion, with the summaries being shared with the interviewees afterwards for confirmation. A list of all the health issues mentioned in either the literature or by interviewees was compiled and examined. The health issues were then categorised into four main themes:

- non-communicable diseases;
- infectious diseases;
- maternal and women's reproductive health; and
- child health.

This categorisation was not mutually exclusive; each health issue could be listed under more than one category if appropriate.

Phase II

Consensus workshop: During the second phase of the study, a workshop was conducted in Bangalore in October 2016 to reach a consensus with the participants on the priority health issues for the local urban slum communities. The majority of participants were interviewees from the first phase, in addition to experts who were invited to participate in the workshop due to their expertise in developing health technologies for low income settings. Preliminary findings from Phase I were shared with the participants. Scoring sheets listing the health conditions identified were prepared for each disease category, and participants were asked to score the health issues in each category based on four criteria: prevalence of the health issue in urban slums (refers to how common it is in urban slum communities they work with); seriousness of the health issue (refers to the extent to which it impacts the overall health of those affected); feasibility of diagnosing/screening for it in the field (refers to the likelihood of being able to screen for the condition in the field); and how beneficial it would be to detect the issue early (refers to whether early screening has the potential to allow better health outcome if these conditions are addressed). These criteria were selected considering the overarching objective of the wider project to which the study belongs (i. e. to develop a screening and diagnostic toolkit to address priority health issues in urban slums). The definitions of the scoring criteria were

IGNOURESULTS.COM

discussed with the participants prior to the prioritisation exercise so that participants shared a similar perception of each of the criteria. Participants were asked to assign a score between 0 and 5 to each health issue; where 1 is the lowest score, 5 is the highest and 0 is “I don’t know”. For example, assigning a score of 1 to a particular health issue for the seriousness of health issue criterion indicates that the health issue is relatively less serious with reference to the urban slum community. All criteria were given equal weight in the calculation of scores, and the average score assigned to each health issue was calculated by summing the scores assigned to a particular health issue by all participants and dividing this total score by the number of participants. Health issues were then ranked from highest score to lowest in all four categories, based on their average score.

Results

Phase I

Systematic literature review: Shown below the numbers of publications identified and screened for eligibility during the literature review. The systematic literature search of the databases yielded 2561 references. After excluding duplicates, a list of 1691 titles was created. Cohen’s Kappa for agreement between reviewers SA and AW regarding the title scoring was 0. 71, which is substantial. The scoring and selection of titles resulted in a list of 384 abstracts. Cohen’s Kappa for agreement on scoring the abstracts between reviewer SA and AW was 0. 80. A total of 94 publications met the inclusion criteria and were eligible for full article assessment. Following the exclusion of studies that did not focus on India and articles for which the full text could not be obtained, a total of 59 articles were examined in full.

IGNOURESULTS.COM

BSOG-171: Society: Images and Reality
Guess Paper-II

Q. What in the reference of tribe and ethnicity in India?

Ans. The world's largest democracy, as India is often referred to, is renowned for its extreme social inequality, as well as its great cultural diversity. Both characteristics are manifest in relation to the 'tribes' as a culturally distinct but – by and large – socio-economically deprived segment of the Indian people. India at large has some of the world's most wealthy people. As a result of the country's economic liberalisation, from the 1990s onwards, it also boasts a middle class of about 200 million people. Unfortunately, in addition to the rich and the middle classes, India continues to have as many people below the poverty line as all of Africa taken together. India's fast economic development promotes a more or less homogenised urban culture, but nevertheless it remains a country of extreme cultural diversity. Its more than a billion citizens are divided along religious, linguistic, regional and ethnic lines, resulting in a large number of distinct groups, the membership of which is said to be decided by birth. Such birth-groups (of which caste is but one manifestation), are sustained by the rather persistent practice to marry within the group. There are new and old tendencies to cross social boundaries on economic grounds, and the idea of the 'love' marriage is gaining ground against that of a marriage 'arranged' by one's relatives. Nevertheless, even the young and highly educated elite, who benefi t the most from India's high economic growth and cultural liberalisation, by and large continue to marry within the birth-group. Religion, caste and ethnicity do not become irrelevant when people engage with global modernity, but are redefined – which includes drawing new boundaries – and continue to act as assets that allow people to hierarchically distinguish themselves from others. The fact that social categories are acknowledged and emphasised by the state plays a major role in India. This draws on a long history of assertive policies, which are invigorated by the proactive nature of the Indian constitutionThe fact that social categories are acknowledged and emphasised by the state plays a major role in India. This draws on a long history of assertive policies, which are invigorated by the proactive nature of the Indian constitution. The leadership of the pre-independence Indian National Congress, and notably the constitution's main architect Bhimrao R. Ambedkar, were acutely aware of the deprivation of India's poor. The constitution, and its later amendments, provide a framework for radical politics of compensatory discrimination. Apart from the reduction of caste based inequality, these provisions also aim to have a positive effect on what are known in India as the 'tribal' communities (however, significantly, these provisions have so far left the Muslim population out). Although far less numerous than the dalits (a term used to refer to erstwhile 'untouchables'), the 'tribal' communities are in many respects considered as even more vulnerable and thus in need of state protection. Lugu Murmu of the Birhor 'tribe' and Markus Schleiter enjoying a drink in the vicinity of the weekly market of Durdura, Mayurbhanj, Orissa (photograph by Shyamranjen Hembram). 'Tribe', as a social category, has not just emerged as an assertive category of an independent postcolonial state, but was introduced prior to that by the colonial state to describe communities that were not believed to be part of 'mainstream society'. Here, the colonial administration has supposedly drawn on terms such as atavika

IGNOURESULTS.COM

(forest dwellers) or girijan (hill people), groups who were at the margins of the postcolonial states. Over the last century, many 'tribals' have settled to urban environments, where they either became deprived day labourers, or more recently, became economically highly successful professionals. The majority of the 'tribal' population is located in rural areas, few of them living in (remote) forests, or in hills and on mountains. Rather than identifying 'tribals' with one of the major religious traditions, they are said to have their own, unique sets of beliefs and rituals. 'Tribal' groups are believed to be outside the caste hierarchy, and attributed an acephalous social organisation. The colonial administration, in its eff orts to categorise the South Asian population, created extensive listings and descriptions of the various 'tribes', their traits and habitats. These colonial descriptions have provided the basis for the creation of 'schedules' (listings) of 'tribal' groups for each federal state in present day India. The category 'Scheduled Tribe' refers today to a 'tribe' being administratively registered by the government, qualifying members of this group for preferential treatment such as access to reserved seats in schools and in electoral bodies, as well as the provision of specific numbers of government jobs. Crucial for the recognition of people as members of a 'tribe' are administrative practices. An extensive administrative machinery exists of government run 'tribal' development initiatives, which plays a major role especially for the development of rural areas with a high percentage of 'tribal' population. Not only have benefi ts that are associated with being 'tribal' invigorated the boundaries of 'tribal' groups, they have also provided an incentive to people to try and have their group registered as such, in order to gain access to these benefits. 'Tribe' plays an increasingly important role among political movements in India. Organisations representing 'tribal' communities unite as adivasi's ('first people') and claim that they are 'indigenous' to India (Xaxa 1999). The presumption is then that present day adivasis or 'tribes' are distinct cultural communities which are historically marginalised and/ or are descendants of the 'original' inhabitants of a given territory. The latter positions other residents of the same territory as the descendants of later migrants, who are subsequently denied 'first' rights towards that land and its resources (Baviskar 2006, Karlsson and Subba 2006). Political movements that build on 'tribal' or adivasi claims tend to further reify the cultural characteristics of these communities: ancestral rituals become staged performances, and photographs of 'tribal' dress and material culture are pictured as hallmarks of 'tribality' on calendars and so on. However far such cultural vignettes are removed from their earlier setting, they allow many of the people concerned to link the present to the past. Contemporary public displays of 'tribality' tend to be romanticised imaginations that have gained prominence due to specific historical and political circumstances, but that does not mean that the people who belong to the communities concerned do not share certain pasts, habits and cultural practices that set them apart from others. Notably, the latter sort of claims are not only advanced by democratic means, but are also more or less explicitly associated with various insurgency movements in central and north eastIndia. Some of these movements have been at war with the Indian state for more than half a century, and are considered by the state as a very serious threat to its integrity. Bureaucratic practices in government offices, and the viewpoints of the officers who conduct these, shape substantially imaginations of 'tribality'Contemporary academic debates on the applicability of categories such as 'tribe' and (more recently) 'indigeneity' in Indiahave a long history. The category 'tribe' has been criticised from the mid-20th century onwards and the forefathers of an anthroplogy on Indian 'tribes' continue to inspire both popular opinion in India as well as academic debates. G. S. Ghurye (1963[1943]) argued that there were no sociological grounds on which a fundamental

IGNOURESULTS.COM

distinction could be made between caste and 'tribe'. One of his main opponents was the self-taught anthropologist Verrier Elwin (1964). Contrary to Ghurye, Elwin argued that 'tribals' were the custodians of unique cultural traditions that were not just distinct but superior to both the Indian and European mainstream. Elwin feared that a denial of the distinctiveness of the 'tribes' would result in their being categorised as low caste Hindus, despised and rejected for habits that went in many ways against the grain of the mainstream population. Thus perceived, the debate on 'tribe' cannot be disconnected from the efforts made to define mainstream Indian society as centred on a kind of high culture, far removed from what then becomes the folk culture at its margins. In many ways, these juxtaposed positions continue to be of importance in the debate on 'tribe' inIndia today. On the one hand, there has been a steady stream of contributions of those who consider 'tribe' as a colonial construct (such as: Bates 1995; Unnithan-Kumar 1997; Pels 2000; Shah 2007). On the other hand, there are sustained efforts to reinforce the case for 'tribe,' stressing the uniqueness and distinctiveness of 'tribal' customs (such as: Singh 2002; Peffer and Behera 2005). Display of 'tribal' dance at the Adivasi Exhibition 2009, Bhubaneswar (photograph by Markus Schleiter). Most of the essays included in this collection are based on new field research. The authors go beyond discrediting 'tribal' essentialism, to enquire into present day cultural practices of building and upholding indigeneity inIndia. Proceeding from contemporary academic perspectives on culture as something that is continuously reconstituted, essentialising imaginations of Indian 'tribes' cannot hold ground (such as: Bourdieu 1992 ; Das and Poole 2004 . More specifically, essentialising ideas on Indian 'tribes' are - similar to hybrid claims of identity - contested in political discourses and as such common Indian people and government bureaucrats themselves are critical of notions such as 'ancient tribes'. The question then is not whether or not Indian 'tribes' are authentic, but rather why and how members of 'tribes', political leaders as well as government officers construct 'tribal' authenticity in a politicised arena, and how this relates to the social and cultural realities 'on the ground'. Virginius Xaxa analyses the relationship between 'tribal' communities and the state. He argues that although it had been shown that 'tribal' communities were, even in precolonial times, integrated at the margins of states, the general assumption is that 'tribal' communities were and are outside the state. Xaxa shows that the measures taken by the Indian state derive from 'tribes' being perceived outside the state as well. The state intends to protect 'tribals' against mainstream society, strengthening 'tribal' cultural institutions, while at the same time furthering their integration with mainstream society. However well intended these measures are, their goals are contradictory, resulting in policies that in one way or another fail to deliver. Prasanna Nayak provides a historical perspective on efforts made by the Indian state towards the development of 'tribal' communities in Orissa, reflecting on changes that have taken place over the last 40 years. He argues that the officers in charge were initially showing great commitmen, however, in later decades their involvement became more habitual, which had great consequences for the quality of the programmes conducted. Nayak argues that a lack of curiosity results in officers maintaining naïve imaginations of 'tribal communism'. Consequently, they succumb to the well-to-do villagers, instead of ensuring that the deprived ones are taken care of. Programmes would not only benefit from a greater commitment, but also from a greater usage of social scientific insights that bypass such romantic notions. Contrary to the emphasis of the Indian state on economic and societal integration of 'tribal' groups in Orissa, it has been very hesitant to do so on the Andaman Islands. There, most of the efforts are focussed on sustaining 'tribal' culture, as Visvajit Pandya shows in relation to the Ongee. Pandya

IGNOURESULTS.COM

suggests that this policy is subverted by large scale migration from mainlandIndia to the islands. The extensive contacts that exist between these migrants and the Ongee cannot be acknowledged, but force the government to take measures that counteract their effects. The result is that 'tribal' culture becomes reified by state agencies, swapped back onto the Ongee who are supposed to follow it, and are stimulated - if not obliged - to comply with this state interpretation of their Ongee customs. However complex the relationship of the Indian state to 'tribal' communities can be, groups that are unable to negotiate a relationship with the state are definitely worse off. Bert Suykens focuses on encounters between government officers and Gottekoya who have fled the Maoist insurgency in Chhattisgarh to the neighbouring state of Andra Pradesh. There, they have taken refuge in a forest area. Forest guards try to evict them, burning down their makeshift houses, while Andra Pradesh state refuses to provide relief since it suspects them of having Maoist sympathies. Having fled the Maoists, but not being acknowledged as refugees by the state, the Gottekoya suffer double marginalisation. Ellen Bal analyses another instance of people who seek recognition by the state. Moreover, her essay takes us toBangladesh, and shows that the involvement of the Indian state with 'tribal' communities has a bearing on neighbouring countries as well. Historically,Bangladesh evolved as a Bengali (primarily Muslim) nation. Garo speaking people are located on both sides of the international border dividingIndia andBangladesh. Whereas Garos used to be politically excluded from a national Bengali identity, spokespersons for a Garo 'nation' are now referring to a transnational Garo identity in order to claim a position within the Bangladeshi state. The Garos of Bangladesh have 'embraced the discourse of indigenous people and indigeneity' in order to claim a place as a minority community withinBangladesh. Finally, Luisa Steur shows that for a movement to position as adivasi can be very effective, even if such claims are historically and sociologically not at all viable. She discusses different approaches by which such a movement can be analysed. 'Deconstructivists' warn against the adverse effects of an indigeneity discourse, stressing its communal components, as well as the pressure that it can exert onto members of the communities involved who fail to fit the 'romantic images of adivasiness'. Contrary to this, 'strategic essentialists' consider adopting an 'adivasi identity' as a strategic move, given the legitimacy that is attributed in popular discourse to 'indigenous' claims to land. Steur shows how academics can move beyond these rather limited approaches, which is required if the complexity of the ways in which subaltern communities relate to the state is to be understood. An occasion for rice-beer in a Santal-farmstead, Durdura, Mayurbhanj, Orissa (photograph by Markus Schleiter). Recent debates on global indigeneity approach it primarily as a cultural imagination, in line with modern claims to hybrid identity (Ginsburgh; Gupta & Ferguson 2001). However, we rather argue for a shift from deconstructonism towards a deeper understanding of processes of building, maintaining, connecting and upholding cultural imaginations. Research in relation to 'tribes', 'indigneity' and cultural diversity inIndiaprovides paradigmatic examples of essentialist indigeneity politics, involving many differing actors who maintain a complex relationship to their purported identity. Research approaching the topic from this angle, is likely to yield new insights. For instance, the cultural and social arenas in which the leaders of 'tribal' movements operate, can be revealed by research along the lines of that of Luisa Steur. And, for instance, the administrative impact on the categorisation of 'tribes' cannot be explained based on an analysis limited to the constitution of development plans. Rather, everyday bureaucratic practices in government offices, and the viewpoints of the officers who conduct these, shape substantially imaginations of 'tribality', as is evident in the contributions by Prasanna Nayak and

IGNOURESULTS.COM

Vishvajit Pandya. Approaching the theme from yet another angle, it is also worth researching how 'tribal' movements are constituted, and how much support their spokespersons manage to gather among the people they claim to represent. From this perspective, attention should also be given to how 'tribal identities' connect to people's lifeworlds, since such 'identities' will normally not only be legitimised with reference to a past, but also be rooted in various ways in present day cultural practices. Indiahas a long history of on the one hand acknowledging, fostering and celebrating diversity, coupled to bitter social conflicts at the expense of its minorities. Analysing the dynamics at play can provide us with new perspectives on the politics of positive discrimination in other parts of the world, while creating awareness of the dark shadows that identity politics can cast.

Q. How was India in the terms of Nation, State and Society?

Ans. The premise of this series of articles is that India has several psychological, political and social ideas to offer to the rest of the modern world. Not only have we moulded many ideas in our own image, we have introduced new ways of living in the modern world. India's contribution could be particularly significant in one of the central ideas of the modern world - the nation-state. A quick caveat, however. Our creative engagement with modernity is nothing special; we are not bearers of a manifest destiny. Modernity being a worldwide phenomenon, every society has had something to contribute to the modern world. If there is something unique to India, it is our sheer size and ancient history and our pioneering role in the anti-colonial struggle. Consequently, we have been able to steer an autonomous course as an independent nation and put our stamp on political affairs in a manner impossible for smaller or less fortunate countries. It is for these reasons our flawed democracy has something to offer to the rest of the world. Universality, sometimes by forceIn the modern era, the most important form of political organisation is the nation-state. The norms of most nation-states reflect a universal conception of human nature. In this account, all human beings are equal. Paradoxically, despite their colonial ventures around the world, European nation-states were the first prototypes for these norm. It helped that the citizens of each European country also mostly share the same language and religion; universality is easier to legitmise if everyone is recognisably like you. But India is clearly not such a place. Here, nearly everyone is recognisably unlike you, in politically significant ways. And that raises the question - what happens when the prototype and the norm of the nation-state differ from each other? Universality is easier to legitmise if everyone is recognisably like you. But India is clearly not such a place.

The beginning of history: The nation-state is a formal system with a well-defined constitution, strict criteria for citizenship and most importantly, a monopoly over violence. This has one evident weakness - nation-states are structurally incapable of being flexible. In the formal system, deviance from the norm comes across as an existential threat. Inevitably, therefore, the nation-state performs poorly when it confronts an internally differentiated populace that does not agree on the basic rules. Faced with dissent from a subset of its population that disagrees with the rules, many nation-states have tended towards ruthlessness and systematic oppression - such as those of Jews in Europe and Tibetans in China. A less violent choice is to assimilate the diverse population into a normative mean, like the American melting pot. But in this case too, the nation-state does not tolerate true difference; it merely coaxes the different groups towards a mean that they are willing to live with together, while the differences persist. Is there an alternative to the nation-state that is more tolerant to

IGNOURESULTS.COM

differences? One alternative - albeit a ghastly one - that the world has tried is empire. Among other things, an empire is a hierarchical organisation of peoples with a centre (say London) and a periphery (say Delhi). An empire contains various peoples but it accords rights to its citizens according to the distance from the centre. In other words, while an empire accepts difference, it has no pretense of providing equality and autonomy. India itself has some of the elements of an empire and a nation-state - a centre-periphery relationship, most obviously with the North-East, and state-sponsored violence against 'suspect' minorities. But what we are looking for is something else - a positive example of tolerance for differences. And it is in this regard that I think India has a useful contribution to make to modernity.

Nation and nation-state in India: India has two identities: one as a nation and the other as a nation-state and despite their similarities, the two are different along some important dimensions. For one, by their nature, nations engage with demands for autonomy far more creatively than nation-states. Second, unlike empires, the nation is a formation of equals: to use a term from Gandhi, it is a voluntary association of the governed. Its primary objective is to ensure the autonomy and freedom of its citizens. And perhaps because its citizens aspire to a dizzying array of outcomes, in India, as in no other large country in the world, the nation still has the potential to reign in the hegemony of the nation-state. The nation is an organic system whose amorphous structure is constructed through geography and history rather than an abstract system of law. The geographical boundaries of the Indian nation have always been fluid though there is a natural boundary coinciding with those of South Asia. The Indian nation also has a genuine history. The Mauryan emperor Ashoka and the Mughal emperor Akbar are part of the history of the Indian nation but not that of the Indian nation-state. A hundred years ago, we had a state but we didn't have a nation. The British justified their rule by its supposed capacity to bring the rule of law to an unruly collection of peoples. When the people rebelled, they were put down by force. In response to British statism, the Indian independence struggle claimed that India was a nation, not just a state and the British did not have the authority or the legitimacy to rule the Indian nation. A central aspect of the nationalist argument was the historical continuity of India all the way back to the Indus valley civilisation. A national identity was crucial to sustain a mass political movement with the goal of achieving true swaraj. The nation's priority over our consciousness persists. Consider this: the major components of the nation-state, namely, the judiciary, the bureaucracy, the police and the army are all descendants of their colonial predecessors. Nevertheless, in our hearts we have rejected the colonial state in recounting the Indian nations 'authentic' history. We are far more likely to invoke Chandragupta than Curzon in our evocation of national identity. It is as if we rejected the history of the nation-state for the history of the nation. Once independence was achieved, however, the goal of nationhood lost priority to the goal of establishing the nation-state. The Congress went from being the party of the nation to being the party of the nation-state. However, the nation did not disappear from the imagination. The 1975-77 Emergency was a decisive factor in the two conceptions of India. Indira Gandhi justified the emergency by alluding to threats to the nation-state, but the Indian people rejected her reasoning. Since then, the nation-state has always been tempered by ideas of nationhood. The emergence of regional and lower caste parties and the permanence of coalition governance points to a future where the nation will have further triumphed over the nation-state. Of course, this picture of nationhood is not complete without pointing out its underbelly. The nation-state's hegemony over the nation has led to the worst violence. The Nazi state stripped Jews of their citizenship before transporting them to concentration camps. In the worst

IGNOURESULTS.COM

case, the bureaucratic violence of the nation-state can collude with the baser instincts of nationhood to perpetrate genocide. India is no stranger to this emotion. The Gujarat riots are the most chilling acts of violence precisely because of the clever combination of nation and nation-state in the acts of the Hindu right. It is imperative, therefore, that progressive voices should not shy away from emotion and passion in favour of abstract ideals. We should not cede religion to fundamentalists, we should not let extremists define our national ideals. The nation is not an exclusive entity - for a particular race, religion or ethnicity. For India to emerge as a good prototype of nationhood, it has to be informed by good norms.

Autonomy and dialogue: What are the norms that should inform the Indian nation? I want to mention two normative principles that stand out in the articulations of nationhood in the preindependence period from Tagore to Aurobindo and Gandhi: the principle of autonomy and the principle of dialogue. The principle of autonomy says that the purpose of the nation is to enable the autonomous existence of its constituents, both individuals and other sub-units. To paraphrase Gandhi, the nation is the primary entity responsible for "the cultures of all the lands blowing through our house as freely as possible without blowing us off our feet. "The principle of dialogue says that the peoples of a nation have primacy over the rules governing the nation. According to this principle the nation is constantly renewed because of the dialogue between its constituents. For example, instead of imposing a strict division between religion and state, we can choose to keep the public space open for a free and respectful communication between religions. The Indian conception of secularism comes closer to this ideal than the western model of separation between Church and State. The peoples of a nation have primacy over the rules governing the nation. According to this principle the nation is constantly renewed because of the dialogue between its constituents.

The beginning of history: To conclude, one should recognise that the need for autonomy and for true dialogue is present in most human cultures. It is true that several western theorists have privileged the role of autonomy and dialogue as the foundation for a just society. The question is whether the largest political unit, the nation-states, nations and empires can adopt these principles. I have argued that nation-states and empires are ill-suited for this purpose. However, these three possibilities - nation-state, empire and nation - are not mutually exclusive. India, China, Russia, the United States and the EU have all three categories in their make-up. We have a choice: should the nation or the nation-state or the empire have the highest value in our political self-conception? In China and the United States it seems as if the nation-state has priority over the nation. Unlike the American and Chinese examples, the Indian experiment with political unity leaves open the possibility that the nation will inform the nation-state. If the usual 'nation-state over nation' hegemony is reversed to become a 'nation and nation-state' relationship, some of the worst forms of formal violence will be curtailed. Is India a "nation-state" or a "state-nation"? This may seem like semantics, but the answer will determine India's democratic future. In their 2011 book, Crafting State-Nations: India and other Multinational Democracies, political scientists Juan Linz, Alfred Stepan, and Yogendra Yadav argued that ethnically diverse societies have one of two options when balancing the twin objectives of nation-building and democracy-building.

Milan Vaishnav: Vaishnav's primary research focus is the political economy of India, and he examines issues such as corruption and governance, state capacity, distributive politics, and electoral behavior. One route is the construction of a nation-state in which the political boundaries of the State mirror the cultural boundaries of the nation. The historian Eugen Weber

IGNOURESULTS.COM

famously described how French leaders in the wake of the Revolution transformed "peasants into Frenchmen" by moulding a common cultural, linguistic, and national identity that was uniquely — and exclusively — French. But for societies that possess strong cultural diversity, at least some of which is territorially based and backed by strong sub-national identities, the nation-state model is ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst. For these complex cases, Linz, Stepan, and Yadav suggest an alternative path — what they term a "state-nation". Whereas a nation-state insists on alignment between the boundaries of the State and nation, a state-nation allows for a multiplicity of "imagined communities" to coexist beneath a single democratic roof. It recognises that citizens can have multiple, overlapping identities that need not detract from a larger sense of national unity. Although the Constituent Assembly debates did not frame arguments in precisely these terms, India's founders grappled with this choice between a unitary Indian nation-state or a flexible state-nation. They shied away from the prevailing European model not out of weakness, but rather a conviction that India's unprecedented diversity could not be corralled into such a hegemonic framework. The power and force of this idea of India was that there was, in fact, no single idea of India. Citizens could belong to an Indian "nation" but also express their pride as Tamils, Urdu-speakers, Hindus or Yadavs. The ability to possess multiple, complementary identities was a key element of the state-nation model, but not the only one. Asymmetric federalism, an embrace of individual rights and collective recognition, and a belief in political integration without cultural assimilation were also critical. Most of India's social cleavages — caste, region, and language — do not pose an existential threat to democratic balancing, thanks to their cross-cutting nature. The only cleavage that can be reduced to a bipolar majority-minority contest is religion. Indeed, advocates of Hindu nationalism have consistently expressed unease with the state-nation model. VD Savarkar's maxim of "Hindu, Hindi, Hindustan" mirrored European-style nationalism based on religious identity, common language, and racial unity. Loyalty to the nation — in this case, the Hindu nation — was paramount. The Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP) 2014 electoral triumph laid the groundwork for Hindu nationalism's resurgence and its present ideological hegemony. In the eyes of Hindu nationalists, India's Hindu identity is not only important on its own terms, but also because it has the potential to foster the kind of coherent national community needed for stability at home and recognition abroad. Since being re-elected in 2019, the BJP has moved with an impressive clarity of purpose in implementing this vision. The abrogation of Article 370 undermines the promise of asymmetric federalism. The fact that asymmetric arrangements in India's Northeast remain untouched creates the perception that such an accommodation was verboten in Jammu and Kashmir because it was India's only Muslim-majority state. In November, the Supreme Court delivered a second longstanding BJP objective in its Babri Masjid judgment. Although the verdict was the product of judicial, not executive, action, the ruling was widely seen as a foregone conclusion. This feeling of inevitability had little to do with the legal merits of the case, but rather the political context in which it was adjudicated. And last week, Parliament passed the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), which grants expedited citizenship to non-Muslim religious minorities originating from three of India's neighbours. It is impossible to view this legislation without recognising its connection to the National Register of Citizens (NRC) in Assam. Frustrated by the fact that a large proportion of the 1. 9 million residents left off the NRC rolls are Hindus, the BJP has pledged to move the CAB in order to end their purgatory. In fact, the party has campaigned on implementing an NRC on a nation-wide basis. These moves suggest a departure from the state-nation model. But India's political leadership

IGNOURESULTS.COM

should think long and hard before uprooting the negotiated framework that has made India the envy of the democratic world. Of the handful of longstanding multinational federal democracies, only India lacks an advanced industrial economy. This does not mean India's model is flawless. The unusual definition of Indian secularism — whereby the State maintains a principled distance from all religious faiths, as opposed to a clear firewall — may have run its course. The opportunistic violation of this doctrine by secular politicians has hollowed out its core. Similarly, it might be time to revisit the idea of separate personal laws for different religious faiths. While one option is to usher in a uniform civil code, another possibility — as Yadav has recently argued — is retaining separate family laws while removing their illiberal provisions. In 1947, if forced to wager, political analysts would have bet that Sri Lanka — not India — would emerge as South Asia's democratic success story. It boasted better human development indicators, higher per capita income, and fewer politically sensitive social cleavages. As India was busy building its state-nation, Linz, Stepan and Yadav note that Sri Lanka was lured down the nation-state path by the siren song of religious hegemony, linguistic uniformity, and cultural assimilation. Sri Lanka's majoritarian experiment is a protracted tragedy that still haunts the island nation. The push to redefine India as a nation-state could lead the country down a similarly precarious road, one whose enduring consequences Indians only need to look southward to grasp.

Q. Explain caste and class system in India?

Ans. In Max Weber's phraseology, caste and class are both status groups. While castes are perceived as hereditary groups with a fixed ritual status, social classes are defined in terms of the relations of production. A social class is a category of people who have a similar socio-economic status in relation to other classes in the society. The individuals and families which are classified as part of the same social class have similar life chances, prestige, style of life, attitudes etc. In the caste system, status of a caste is determined not by the economic and the political privileges but by the ritualistic legitimation of authority. In the class system, ritual norms have no importance at all but power and wealth alone determine one's status (Dumont, 1958). Class system differs in many respects from other forms of strati-fication—slavery, estate and caste system. In earlier textbooks such as written by Maclver, Davis and Bottomore, it was observed that caste and class are polar opposites. They are antithetical to each other. While 'class' represents a 'democratic society' having equality of opportunity, 'caste' is obverse of it. Following are the main differ-ences between class and caste systems:

- Castes are found in Indian sub-continent only, especially in India, while classes are found almost everywhere. Classes are especially the characteristic of industrial societies of Europe and America. According to Dumont and Leach, caste is a unique phenomenon found only in India.
- Classes depend mainly on economic differences between groupings of individuals—inequalities in possession and control of material resources—whereas in caste system non-economic factors such as influence of religion [theory of karma, rebirth and ritual (purity-pollution)] are most important.
- Unlike castes or other types of strata, classes are not established by legal or religious provisions; membership is not based on inherited position as specified either legally or by custom. On the other hand, the membership is inherited in the caste system.

IGNOURESULTS.COM

- Class system is typically more fluid than the caste system or the other types of stratification and the boundaries between classes are never clear-cut. Caste system is static whereas the class system is dynamic.
- In the class system, there are no formal restrictions on inter-dining and inter-marriage between people from different classes as is found in the caste system. Endogamy is the essence of caste system which is perpetuating it.
- Social classes are based on the principle of achievement, i. e. , on one's own efforts, not simply given at birth as is common in the caste system and other types of stratification system. As such social mobility (movement upwards and downwards) is much more common in the class structure than in the caste system or in other types. In the caste system, individual mobility from one caste to another is impossible.

This is why, castes are known as closed classes (D. N. Majumdar). It is a closed system of stratifi-cation in which almost all sons end up in precisely the same stratum their fathers occupied. The system of stratification in which there is high rate of upward mobility, such as that in the Britain and United States is known as open class system. The view that castes are closed classes is not accepted by M. N. Srinivas (1962) and Andre Beteille (1965).

- In the caste system and in other types of stratification system, inequalities are expressed primarily in personal relation-ships of duty or obligation—between lower- and higher-caste individuals, between serf and lord, between slave and master. On the other hand, the nature of class system is impersonal. Class system operates mainly through large-scale connections of an impersonal kind.
- Caste system is characterised by 'cumulative inequality' but class system is characterised by 'dispersed inequality. '
- Caste system is an organic system but class has a segmentary character where various segments are motivated by competition (Leach, 1960).

A caste is a social category whose members are assigned a permanent status within a given social hierarchy and whose contacts are restricted accordingly. It is the most rigid and clearly graded type of social stratification. It has also often been referred to as the extreme form of closed class system. Sharply contrasted with the caste system, the open class system ran be placed at the opposite end of a continuum. A social class has been defined as an abstract category of persons arranged in levels according to the social status they possess. There are no firm lines dividing one category from another. A social class consists of a number of individuals who share similar status often ascribed at birth but capable of being altered. Class, therefore, does not consist of organised closed groups defined by law or religion as does caste, nor are the various strata in the system as rigid and easily identifiable. The following table summarizes a comparison between the class and caste system of society.

Comparison between the Class and Caste System of Society

Characteristics of Class Pattern and Caste Pattern

Both caste and class symbolize two types of stratifications of rural society. There are two approaches:

- Marxist
- Non-Marxist/Weberian

Marxists analyse stratification of rural India in terms of modes of production and relations of production. Marxists say that there are many variables but the most important variable is the

IGNOURESULTS.COM

mode of production. Non-Marxists or Weberians feel that stratification takes place because of three variables.

- Wealth
- Power
- Prestige
- Wealth is defined as ability to produce or inherit properties.
- Prestige refers to honour and style of life.
- Power means the ability to control over others.

When all these three things are considered, the individuals are accordingly categorized. The stratification system Involve any quality which means a group of persons may get more power/prestige/wealth or all the three in combination. Many studies have been conducted on the basis of Marxist analysis. They have given emphasis on:

- Ownership of land
- Types of peasants (i. e. landowners, petty landholders, landless labours)
- Types of technology which is used at the time of production,
- Labour class.
- Amount of surplus at the time of production.

Supporters of Non-Marxist approach consider class, status and power as the basis of social stratification of rural India. Andre Beteille has conducted a study on caste, class and power. K. L Sharma has conducted a study on changing rural stratification system. In rural India, people are generally identified according to their caste. In South India, village is given priority in identifying a person. Iravati Karve observed that an Indian is identified mainly through three variables/areas:

- Caste
- Language
- Village.

In Indian village, northern or southern, caste has a very important role in giving identification to the individual. Y. Singh analyses caste from two perspectives:

- Caste as a cultural phenomenon.
- Caste as a structural phenomenon.

Caste as a Cultural Phenomenon:

Caste is associated with an autonomous form of cultural system or world view. The basis of cultural system is:

- Institutionalized inequality.
- Closed social mobility.
- Simple Division of Labour (assignment of occupation).
- Ritualistic reciprocity (dependence on other caste categories for some rituals or customs).
- Importance of purity and pollution.

Caste as a Structural Phenomenon: The structural aspect of caste is stressed by functionalists who express structural and functional analysis of the caste system. The basis of structural analysis is:A system of social organisation. An institutionalized system of Interaction among hierarchically ranked hereditary group. This type of Interaction is expressed in the area

IGNOURESULTS.COM

of marriage/occupation/ economic division of labour/enforcement of cultural norms and values by caste bodies/performance of rituals based on principles of purity and pollution. The structural properties of caste like endogamy, caste, occupation and hierarchy have a direct linkage with social stratification. The cultural aspects, on the other hand, are value loaded. While analysing rural stratification, it is observed that it has some specific features like co-operation among caste groups, following rules of endogamy and exogamy, occupational inter-dependency, caste association etc. Ghanshyam Saha has conducted a study on caste sentiments, class formation and dominance in Gujarat and found that caste plays an important role In the field of politics, particularly at the time of voting during elections. Bihar has also similar experiences. It is confirmed from different studies that the village community is going to be divided into high caste and low caste due to reservation policy. M. N. Srinivas has analysed the new form of Caste as the "20th Century Avatar. "In relation to class and caste, there are two schools of thought:

- Caste is breaking down and class is taking its place.
- Caste and class are not opposite to one another rather class comes within the caste system. For example – Brahmin is a caste and within Brahmins we find rich Brahmins and poor Brahmins.

Andre Beteille in his article "Class Structure in an Agrarian Society" argues that some of the castes In rural society, particularly in West Bengal (where he had conducted his study) are moving towards the formation of class but the procedure of movement is clear. P. Kolenda found in her study that, In Rural India, the importance of caste has decreased to a great extent. Instead of caste, the Importance of class is found. She has conducted her study in Kanya Kumari. Categorically, Kolenda says that in Rural India middle class is emerging fast. She concluded:

- Caste is replaced by class
- Emergence of a new class i. e. the middle class.

Jan Breman has conducted his study in Bardoli areas of Surat district of Gujarat. He found that government policies are mainly responsible for widening the gap between the rich and the poor. For example: Green Revolution. Capitalist mode of production is mainly responsible for the emergence of class structure in Rural India. Breman and Kolenda both have the same opinion that class is emerging in Rural India. S. M. Shah in his study on Rural class structure in Gujarat found that ownership of land is the main index of social stratification. The owner cultivation and the owner tenant cultivation are the only two classes who own the land. The rest are the Landless labourers and they form proletariat group. His findings say that land ownership along with educational qualification makes the gap wider In Rural India. The concept of "dominant caste" (given by M. N. Srinivas) has lost its importance in rural India due to:

- The big landowners are migrating to urban and industrialised centres. They have taken new sources of income.
- Ceiling legislations deprived them from the status of big landowners.

K. L. Sharma, in the above context, has given two conclusions:

- Abolition of feudal system has reduced the power of Jajmans.
- The members of weaker sections have received new power from democratic institutions.

When a caste is transformed to a class, the caste-class conflict emerges in a particular social condition and we find caste wars. For example: In U. P. and Bihar etc. caste wars are very frequent. In Kerala also there is a mobilization of power which is based on both caste and class.

IGNOURESULTS.COM

Iqbal Narain and P. C. Mathur have conducted their study on Rajputs of Rajasthan. Rajputs preferred to make alliance with Baniyas and Jains because of which the status and power of Brahmins was reduced. In the agricultural field or in connection to agrarian production also we find class system. These classes are agricultural classes. In other words, landholdings have never been even in rural India. Differences in the size of land have created diverse agricultural classes in rural society. A broad classification of agricultural classes are:

- Big farmers
- Small farmers
- Marginal farmers
- Landless labourers

Caste-class transformation is a very complex process.

Caste-Class Nexus: Nexus is defined as a set of ties in connection to the basic structural and cultural changes.

It indicates:

- Interdependency between both factors.
- Contradictions and similarities.
- Control of one group over the other.

Caste and class nexus implies observation of two as mutually inherent areas. Tension and contradiction between caste and class are not only recognizable but also bring their differential consequences on different castes and classes. This nexus between caste and class also implies going beyond caste and going beyond class in understanding social reality. A group of sociologists give their view that Indian society can be best studied from a caste model. They justify their opinion by saying that caste is an over-reaching ideological system encompassing all aspects of social life of Hindus, in particular, and the other communities, in general. The problem, however, is the fact that caste system is very complicated and complex. At the Lime of marriage, with all the rigid rules and regulations, a caste gives prime importance to the class. So the assumption is that class is taking the place of caste is incorrect. Both caste and class are inseparable parts of Indian social formation. The sociologists who feel that recent changes are giving way to class than to caste have nothing but a misapprehension. This is because there are studies in which it is observed that castes are also equally important as class. If caste is getting weak in one aspect it also gets strengthened in other aspects simultaneously with certain additions. In conclusion, we can sum up that both caste and class are inseparable and closely interlinked. Class like distinction within caste and caste life-style within the class are a part and parcel of the members of the society. Both caste and class are real, empirical, interactional and hierarchical. One incorporates the other. Common class consciousness among the members of a caste is mainly due to their common economic deprivations. In connection to caste-class nexus some conclusion can be drawn:

- The caste system functions as an extremely effective method of economic exploitation.
- The caste hierarchy is linked with social hierarchy and it reflects ownership of land.
- Caste determines a definite relation with the means of production.
- B. R. Ambedkar rightly observed that the caste system not only divides labour or indicate division of labour but also divides the entire social structure.

IGNOURESULTS.COM

BSOG-171: Society: Images and Reality
Guess Paper-III

Q. Explain the resistance and process in India of critique?

Ans. In recent years, the very idea of History has been much deconstructed and criticized (see for instance Anderson 1991, Duara 1995). The modern territorial nation and linear History are seen to have co-produced each other as the principal mode of belonging in the twentieth century. Individuals learn to identify with nation states that have supposedly evolved over a long history to reach the self-conscious unity of the two and are thus poised to acquire mastery over the future. The linear History of modem nation-states projects a territorial entity (the nation) backwards in time as its subject [or actor or agent) which evolves or progresses to the present and future. In projecting the presently constituted or claimed territorial nation into the past, national histories seek to appropriate for the present nation-state the peoples, cultures and territories which actually had scant relations with the old empires.

Here I will consider other narratives or discourses which have challenged this History of the nation in China and India. Because these alternative narratives have been largely ignored or marginalized in both nationalist narratives and modern scholarship, it is important to explore their critical potential. These alternative narratives centre principally around the notion of "culture". The early usage of culture to oppose evolutionism can be found within Europe itself in the writings of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803). Those figures in Asia whose alternative ideas I try to understand through the notion of culture were, perhaps, mostly unaware of Herder's usage, but the circumstances of its appearance in the two contexts have much in common. According to George Stocking, in the late' 18th century Herder reacted against the cultural imperialism of French and Scottish Enlightenment conception of universal progress and the implicit hierarchy of cultural achievement. He emphasized the variety of national character, each national culture an expression of its own unique Volkgeist, all equally manifestations of the divine realizing itself in the spiritual development of humanity as a whole. To be sure, while Herder may be seen as a source of pluralism and anthropological relativism, his notion of culture never closed the back door to racialist evolutionism. Each national spirit evolved from an "internal prototype": Jews would retain the spirit of their ancestors, blacks could never acquire the "finer intellects" of the Europeans, and so on (Stocking 1987, 20). Thus, if 'culture" presented an oppositional stance towards the Enlightenment discourse of "civilization", which since Hegel we have identified as History, it was also capable of recalling this evolutionism as a supplement. Within Asia this oppositional mode has also challenged linear, evolutionary conceptions. More often than not, like Herder's critique, these challenges have targeted one or more dimensions while reproducing other assumptions of the dominant narrative of History. Thus, Zhang Taiyan (1869. 1936) and occasionally, Lu Xun (1881-1936) denied progress while accepting evolutionism (Ogata 1984), Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941) and Liang Shuming (1893-?), each in their own way, denied comparability while accepting progress. Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948) was one of the only significant figures to deny History in toto. The latter half of this essay will seek to understand the significance of Gandhi's thought as well as the mirror in which his total and determined opposition to History was reflected. Modern

IGNOURESULTS.COM

scholarship has not been particularly sympathetic to these critics of the Enlightenment project. For example, history text-books in America, India or China either ignore most of these figures, or, where they are unable to ignore them, as in the case of Gandhi, assimilate their actions and ideas into the narrative of national liberation or into a lesson on moral courage. There is a tendency to pass over the critique of modernity. The dominant narrative of modern Chinese history in both China and the West is the narrative of modernization. This has been seen as a painful and uncertain process, which has nonetheless, inched towards a full modern consciousness in distinct phases. These phases are familiar enough and I will just outline them. The narrative begins with the Opium War of 1840 and the initial refusal of the imperial state and the mandarinate to recognize the challenges posed by the West. This was followed by the self-strengthening movement where Western learning was sought to be confined to practical matters designed to strengthen the empire, while Chinese learning was reserved for all essential matters -the classic ti-yong dichotomy'. 1 With the increasing failure of the self-strengtheners to confront the military challenges of the late 19th century, segments of the literati and progressive bourgeoisie began to advocate institutional reform without challenging the basic principles of the Confucian imperial system. The exemplary representative of this phase is Kang Youwei (1858-1927) and his experiments during the 100 Days of Reform. The 1911 republican revolution challenged, of course, the traditional political system, but it was left to the May 4th movement of 1917-1921, to finally and systematically attack the very cultural underpinnings of the old system. Of course, this simple linear narrative does not do full justice to the complex responses to modern discourses that emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Those who responded by questioning the project of total modernization in China, have been called conservative, although Benjamin Schwartz has observed that their responses are very modern (Schwartz 1976, 4). Particularly in the Chinese political context, they have been painted in negative colours as people opposed to the epochal trends of progress and freedom. I would like to extend Charlotte Furth's very useful distinction between two "conservatism" or what I call questioning narratives of modernity in China (Furth 1976, 39-41). The first form is one which tried to separate culture from politics and thus was able to find compatibilities between science, rationality and traditional culture. In this form, culture was often subordinated to the needs of politics and technology. The second finds this distinction difficult to sustain because it sought to exalt spiritual culture over materiality. Thus, the values and ideals of this culture would necessarily shape certain essential aspects of political and material life. Represented by the national essence school (guocui) of thinkers like Zhang Binglin (i. e. Zhang Taiyan) and Liu Shipei, the first type according to Furth, was concerned with the preservation of those cultural ideals seen as embodying the historical genius of the Chinese people (Furth 1976, 31-32; see also Chang 1987, 112, 150). As such, this school was not opposed in principle to modernity, but questioned its adequacy for the life of the nation and the individual. At its edges, I find that this nationalist critique tended to merge with formulations of the East versus West binary which depicted the East as the source of spiritual culture and the West as the source of material or scientific Western culture, both of which, however, were necessary for humanity. Thus the critique of History through culture, while mostly used to anchor the nation on alternative grounds, was also linked to a redemptive universalist model. Most of the critiques of modernity we encounter in both China and India are versions of this form. The ideas of Liang Qichao (1873-l 929) on his return from Europe after witnessing the devastation of the First World War exemplify this model of (national) culture with aspirations to redeem the universe. Liang now believed that

IGNOURESULTS.COM

Chinese Eastern) civilization had a great responsibility towards the world to counter the destructiveness of Western civilization (Hay 1970, 137-140). This model received much patronage from visiting Western philosophers like Russell and Dewey and from its most ardent advocate, Rabindranath Tagore, whose pan-Asianism was deeply affected by his personal friendships in China. Although Tagore's last visit to China in 1929 was welcomed neither by the CCP nor the KMT (Hay 1970, 323-324), even the Kuomintang (KMT) leader Dai Jitao (Tai Chi-tao)(1884-1949) espoused the theme of Asian spiritual unity in the magazine New Asia during the early 1930s where he depicted Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) as the father of a pan-Asianism focussed on China's cultural values. In Dai, anti-imperialism and the discourse of culture coalesced together into a popular Chinese image of the time which saw the entire society as a "proletariat responsible both for the Asian anti-imperialist struggle and for preserving the purity of Asian culture" (Mast and Saywell 1974; 98). The second type of critique of modernity was embodied in what Furth calls the neo-traditional Confucianism of figures like Kang Youwei and Liang Shuming and was centrally concerned with the religious and spiritual questions. Although they were not necessarily opposed to modernity, they perceived the religious truths of Confucianism as occupying not only a separate, but a more elevated, plane than did science. In other words, this was a realm which embedded Truth that theoretically could not be judged by the standards of science or History. One may see this notion of culture in a Herderian light, but it is also continuous with the self-strengtheners' 'ti-yang" formulation which regarded the moral goals of Confucianism as the ends of technological adaptation. 2 For 20th century Confucianists culture could not be completely separated from politics since the religio-moral values I Confucianism could not but inform the polity and society. This was not true for the adherents of the national essence school because the culture they advocated was in some senses subordinate, or at least, adaptable to the requirements of modernity. They could choose the substance or content of culture to suit the requirements of the age in a way in which a Confucianist could not because he sought to carry over certain substantive values and orientation to the world.

Because he was inspired by the evolutionism of History, scholars have tended to regard Kang Youwei as operating essentially within its problematic. Certainly, he reveals some of the most unfeeling racial prejudices of evolutionism. In his of utopia in 'The Great Unity (datong), Kang writes of the inferior races, which include all but the white and yellow races, that they will be decimated by the natural principle of the strong prevailing over the weak. For instance, the "fierce and ugly" races of India who die by many thousands in epidemics each year, will hardly be able to overcome the British; since the bodies (Negroes "smell badly", it is difficult for the racial barrier against them to be levelled. Those few of the black and brown races who are not annihilated will marry with the lighter races and will ultimately become amalgamated with the white people (Kang 1958, 142-3). And yet the intensity with which he subscribed to evolutionism should not blind us to another dimension of his thought which emphasized love and equality of all in the world. Chang Hao (1967) stresses the indeterminacy of Kang's ideas drawn from different Confucian schools, Buddhism as well as Western ideas. Thus Kang's evolutionism co-exists (not without tension, see Kang 1958, 41) with a moral quest and activism which derived from a Confucian "cosmic imperative" and his utopia is informed by the moral values of fen (benevolence, altruism). Indeed, if one views Kang not only as a political thinker, but as a philosopher and religious leader, as did his disciples like Liang Qichao, then we have to see his ultimate goal as the spread of Confucian moral and spiritual teachings in order to save the world. (Chang 1987, 21-65).

IGNOURESULTS.COM

However, few Confucianists of the 20th century were practically able to realize this religio-moral vision in society, at lea! in a form that made it recognizably different from the modern vision of society. Were they perhaps content with Feng Youlan's (or Fung Yulan) suggestion that "the sage within is simply a man whose outer kingliness lies in the fact that he does what everyone does but understands it differently"? (Cited in Furth 1976, 41). Liang Shuming may have been among the few who insisted that the sage's actions in the world must be realized in the form of a Confucianist moral community. Liang's rural reconstruction institutes were inspired by Mencius: The elite were to be the teachers, responsible for leading the masses and for their ethical transformation. In this sense, the teacher was to aspire to be a sage; the central institutional agent of the government was to be the school; and the cadre were to be the spiritual hierarchy of dedicated students. He loathed the self-interested, competitive spirit of Western capitalism and attacked the Westernized educational system for creating a privileged class that has lost the tradition of the morally perfect junkie or 'gentleman"(Alitto 200). He sought to reorganize society on the basis of the traditional ethical bonds through such hallowed institutions as the 11th century xiangyue (village compact), so that society an moral instruction "could make an indivisible whole" (Alitto 206). At the same time, like Kang, Liang 'Shuming never really parted with the evolutionist perspective. But it was an evolutionism that was re-worked to rid it of any value hierarchy, 01 the three stage of Will that he wrote about, the Western stage, the Chinese stage and the Indian stage, each was equally validly concerned with the problems of humanity at the appropriate stage of development of course, as Alitto points out, none of this critique prevented him from identifying the essence of Chinese culture as an absolute value (Alitto 1979, 84).

Many of the same processes and tendencies can also be found in the 19th and 20th century history of India, but the narrative has not been emplotted in the same way. Here, the critique of modernity has almost as much visibility as the narrative of progress although the sting of the former has often been removed. We may see the narrative of progress as tied together at three points by the figure of Ram Mohun Roy (1772-1833) and the Bengal Renaissance, the moderate wing of the nationalist Congress Party at the turn of the century, and by Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964), first Prime Minister of India. But the shadow of a parallel process (not quite narrativized) of the critique of History allows us to see how the orderly succession of a lines narrative, as in the progression to modernity in Chinese historiography, may be bifurcated by relating each of these development, to a reaction or counter-movement in the parallel process.

The climax of the Chinese narrative represented by the birth of full modern self-consciousness in the May 4th movement actually begins the narrative in the Indian case. The Bengal Renaissance of the first half of the 19th century championed by it; initiator and central figure, Ram Mohun Roy upheld reason and individual rights against "superstition" and the hierarchy of cast1 and family. True, he held onto Hinduism, but this Hinduism was transformed into a Unitarianism and the repository of reason Moreover, by virtue of the very rationalistic methods whereby he sought to establish his case, he revealed himself to be modernist and is popularly known in India as the "Father of Modem India". Ram Mohun and his followers advocated the improved status of women, the adoption of English language and scientific education in Bengal (Ray 1975, 14-15). Even more radical than Roy was the Young Bengal movement of the 1820s, a smaller-scale but more thoroughly iconoclastic movement of the Westernized Bengali youth led by the Anglo-Indian, Henry Vivien Derozio (1809-1831). Influenced by the philosophy of Hume and Bentham and radical thinkers like Tom Paine, they claimed to measure everything with the

IGNOURESULTS.COM

yardstick of reason. Their attitude to religion, which was informed by Voltaire, led them to denounce the Hindu religion with great fervor (Ahmed 1975, 99). For the Derozians as for the May 4th iconoclasts, the total rejection of the old was only matched by the total affirmation of the new. As the 19th century drew on, however, the early form of radical iconoclasm against Hinduism and tradition in general subtly began to give way to more complex, if not always more nuanced, responses to modem ideas and practices. Bankim Chardra Chattopadhyay (1838-1894) perhaps the most acclaimed man of letters in the Calcutta of his days, and who had once described himself as a member of the Young Bengal group (Raychaudhuri 1988, 203), articulated one such response to modernity which was to find many adherents among the intelligentsia of late 19th and 20th century India as a whole. Bankim acknowledge significance and desirability of science and rationality. The West had achieved progress, prosperity and freedom beta placed reason at the heart of its culture. But the West was superior only in the culture of material life, and had little to contribute to the spiritual aspect of life. Here it was the East that had the upper hand. Man was imperfect if he had developed side, especially the material. The perfect and complete man combined the religious truths of Hinduism with the love To be sure, figures like Chattopadhyay, just as much if not more than the Chinese, were affected by European (Raychaudhuri 1988, 8) who, it might be said, projected a yearning for a "lost spirituality" into Oriental societies. Bankim Chandra and other like-minded thinkers such as Aurobindo Ghosh (1872-1950) and Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902) occupy a place in the trajectory of opposition to modernity somewhere between the national culture group and the neo- traditional Confucianists. Like the former, Bankim recognized the significance and necessity of modern ideas: rationalism, progress, individualism. But his nationalism led him to claim that a purified and regenerated Hindu ideal was far superior as a rational philosophy of life than anything Western religion or philosophy had to offer. Like the cultural essence school, Bankim distinguished modernity from westernism, and claimed that modernity could become part of a transcendent Hindu cultural ideal. But in practice, the tensions in his thought led him to oppose reformers who advocated reform of Hindu customs and practices by appealing to the colonial state on the basis of enlightened reason. Bankim did not oppose reform in principle; but he believed that change would and should follow from the new moral consensus that would emerge from the rejuvenated national culture, or national religion as he preferred to call it (Chattejee 1986, 73-79). Thus, as with Liang Shuming, politics and culture could never really remain separate: the religio-moral insight would necessarily shape the vision of the ideal society that had to be realized.

In the history of Indian nationalism, the early 20th century is seen as marking a political break between the extremists and moderates; between those who wanted immediate independence and would use agitational politics to achieve it and those who sought more gradual, constitutional modes to attain concessions ultimately towards independence. From the perspective of culture, this political break also fits, albeit imperfectly, with the incorporation within mainstream nationalism of a discourse of the nation founded in Hindu culture as opposed to the European model of civilizational progress for the colonies. The assumptions of the latter are captured in the Moderate critique of "the un-British rule of the British in India" to which Moderates like G. K. Gokhale (1866-1915) and Jawaharlal Nehru's father, Motilal Nehru (1861-1931) subscribed. Hindu nationalism was exemplified by Gokhale's fellow Maharashtrian, the extremist B. G. Tilak (l856-1920), who took nationalist rhetoric out of the lawyers' chambers and into the streets to mobilize Hindus during their communal festivities. Although Gandhi

IGNOURESULTS.COM

drew his ideas from a variety of sources and evolved a unique blend, he too drank deeply from this trope of "culture", of an irreducible (Hindu) spirituality as a foundation for his nationalism. At this point, the Indian narrative of national modernization becomes complicated. We are at a cross-road: should we focus on Jawaharlal Nehru as the flowering of modern consciousness or on Gandhi who turns his back on History? We could by focusing on Nehru and the segment of the intelligentsia favoring the vision of a fully modern society which dominated certain, strategic points of Indian public life through most of the independence movement, develop the narrative of emancipation. To be sure, even among this group, there were few who advocated the kind of break with history that we have seen in the May 4thor even among the Derozians. For Nehru the significance of traditions lay not in a transcendent spiritual or moral telos but in the historical development of the nation. All the great rulers of Indian history such as Asoka, the Guptas, Akbar and several of the Moghul emperors attempted to develop a political framework to unite the cultural diversity of the sub-continent. This History, while giving the Indian people their unique qualities, also placed them within the progressive and emancipatory project of the Enlightenment.
Like the Chinese historians, Nehru saw the historical nation through the biological metaphor of growth and decline. The great heights of Indian thought, culture and science had been reached as early as the 11th century and subsequently entered a long dark period of rigidity and stagnation (Nehru 1960, 121-128). To be sure there were short cycles of creativity thereafter, especially during the reign of Akbar and some of the other Moghul emperors, but until the modern period which was uniquely the period of vigour and dynamism of the Europeans, there was no basic growth in India. From even this brief outline, we may see that Nehru displays an ambivalence regarding the question of a pre-formed national subject of ancient times. The end of creativity coincides roughly with the advent of the Islamic period, but individual Muslim monarchs are able to re-generate society periodically. Certainly there was no question of the substance of an ancient culture re-appearing in Jawaharlal Nehru's Discovery of India. That was left to Hindu nationalists of different stripes from the benign to the savagely vengeful. Even more than for the cultural nativists, culture and politics ware separable for Nehru. Indeed not only were they separable, but culture occupied a distinctly subordinate position in relation to history, And as with the Chinese Marxists, a national culture may once have embodied (and will again embody) the supreme ideals of its age. Though not a Marxist, in the way in which Nehru sustained the ideas of the uniqueness of national culture within a modernist vision of History, he resembled the Chinese Marxists when they were not violently anti-historical. Perhaps we can place his ideas somewhere between the nativists and the Marxists in China. But the narrative has to confront the figure and impact of Gandhi. He is perhaps among the most difficult political figures to understand in terms taken from modern discourses. My reading of Gandhi here owes much to works by Partha Chattejee and Ashis Nandy, What were Gandhi's basic ideas about modem civilization? For Gandhi the religio-moral vision was so compelling that it could not brook the separation of politics and culture, a distinction regarded by true believers – whether Gandhi or the variety of religious fundamentalists that we encounter in the world today – to be a particular imposition of modernity itself. In Hind Swaraj published first in 1909, Gandhi launches a total indictment of modem civilization as it has developed in the West and subsequently brought into India. Gandhi pursues a line of argument that can also be found in the Western romantic tradition as well as in certain Hindu and Buddhist texts. His argument, however, is not founded upon a textual or scriptural tradition, but rather on a universalist moral

IGNOURESULTS.COM

philosophy. According to Gandhi, the modern organization of society which is designed to release its productive potential and produce increasing wealth and comfort fork all, is ultimately self-destructive. Modem civilization actually makes the individual a prisoner of his or her own craving for luxury and self-indulgence, generates a destructive competitiveness and brings about poverty, inequality, and large-scale violence.

Unlike the Marxists, who critiqued coionialism for its class character but praised it for unleashing new productive forces and technology in "stagnant, feudal societies", Gandhi criticizes precisely these productive forces. Modern machinery can only create the desire for more goods, it can never satisfy it. Worse, industrialism brings destruction, exploitation and disease to a society, and creates an especially exploitative relationship between the city and the village (Gandhi 1938, 66-70). If modem industrialism cannot find a place in Gandhi's religio-moral vision of society, nor can the modem state. For Gandhi, whose anarchism was influenced by Tolstoy, the critique of the modern state flows logically from his ideas about industrtalism. The modern state was only necessary because of the needs of industrialism and the co-ordination of large-scale orgnizations. Parliamentary representation does not improve Gandhi's image of the state because representative politics is based on a competitive individualism. In the new independent India, the state could never be the appropriate machinery for the rejuvenation of village society and economy. More important, the slate as a coercive agency could not c/aim an inalienable authority for that authority lay in the law of Dharma or moral duty which resided outside the state (lyre 1973, 253-260). Only religion possessed that transcendent authority by means of which the existing establishment could be challenged.

Gandhi proposed a utopian society of largely autarkic village communities called Ramarajya (or the kingdom of Rama, the legendary sage-king). This was to be a patriarchy in which the ruler, by his exemplary moral qualities expressed the collective will. It is also a utopia in which the economic organization of production, arranged according to an idealized "varna" form of organization with a perfect system of reciprocity, would ensure that there would be no competition and differences in status. The ideal conception of Ramarajya, in fact, encapsulates the critique of all that is morally reprehensible in the economic and political organization of civil society (Chatterjee 1986, 92). The similarity of this vision to a Mencian conception of society is striking, but its similarity to a Maoist utopian vision is even more intriguing.

If we temporarily free Mao from the narrative of modernity and slice Chinese historical materials from the angle of a counter-narrative, we can make much sense of both Gandhi and Mao. Both 'were in search of alternative forms of community, alternatives to competitive – in particular, market – models of society implicit in the emancipation of idea, Although Mao held on to the notion of economic progress, their common concern for economic and politically autarkic communes, the loathing of urban domination, the mistrust of technological expertise, and the superiority of spontaneously self-governing communities over systems of representation, whether this was the Party or Parliament, confirmed for both the necessity of subordinating politics to a communal morality.

While History itself for Mao remained within the progressive linearity of the Hegelian-Marxist formulation, the question of human will as the counter-point to the automaticity of the unfolding of History remained unresolved, as it did in the formulation generally. According to Frederic Wakeman (1973), Mao's understanding of will provides an opening to influences from Chinese intellectual and moral traditions, including those from Wang Yangming to Kang Youwel. Wakeman is careful to note that this is not some timeless influence and he tracks it

IGNOURESULTS.COM

particularly through Kang Youwei's synthesis in the early part of the century which, although we have seen it to have been an incomplete synthesis, identified the telos of evolution as the morality of ren. We may see this pre-occupation in Mao's view in the fact that the ability to make History demanded the possession of a moral force, "a kind of revolutionary sincerity" or purity among individuals (Wakeman 1973,324). Thus it is the irruption of an obscured geneously of ren into the dominant narrative that moved Mao, perhaps despite himself, to subvert the telos of progressive History by the quest for a moral community.

Yet, Mao was not an anti-modernist while Gandhi most definitely was. Mao's communal utopia was not transcendent; indeed, it was immanent and, frighteningly, imminent. Gandhi's utopia was based upon a distinctly transcendent foundation and such he was able to resist assimilation into the romantic critique of modernity. Chattejee argues that European romantics critiqued science and rationality from within the Enlightenment discourse. They never called for the ultimate abandonment of Reason, but were rather torn between the demands of Reason and Morality, Progress and Happiness, Historical Necessity and Human Will. These tensions did not trouble Gandhi, as they did many other Indian thinkers and leaders including Tagore (Chatterjee 1986, 99-100). The foundation of Gandhi's views of society derived fundamentally from his composite religious vision of Truth, denying History, and defying the Enlightenment problematique of his age. But the nation was not denied: at least not for the moment. Having no anchor in History, or even in history (which has no permanent anchor), the nation would have to embody the transcendent Truth. What makes it possible for someone like Gandhi and his ideas to occupy the supremely important place that they do in Indian society and history? It is most unusual to find the general acceptability and prestige accorded such anti-modern ideas among people educated in modem society in other parts of the world. The contrast is particularly striking in the comparison with China, both with the Republic of China (ROC) and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Although I have compared him with Mao, the comparison must break tin with respect to Mao's ultimate adherence to the Engtightenment project and his violent rejection of the past. Then, of course, there is the case of Liang Shumtog who has been compared to Gandhi. Indeed, Liang liked to regard himself as a Chinese Gandhi. But the comparison with Liang Shuming is telling, because Liang's influence or prestige among China's intelligentsia is but a fraction of Gandhi's in Indian society.

To be sure, practically speaking, Gandhi accommodated, and was happily accommodated by, many modern forces, not the least of which was the emergent Indian industrial bourgeoisie, especially the house of the Bida. But regardless of whether or not his ideas are practtsed in India today, the relative prestige that they occupied itself needs explanation. Moreover, although we are often reminded that Gandhi's political and economic ideas are no longer, nor were they really ever, influential in India, they have existed as a strong oppositional force criticizing the establishment. Oppositional groups inspired by Gandhian ideas seek to critique the most extreme effects of modernity and provide ways, however meagre, of mitigating its most destructive results, whether they be the social costs of large-scale industrialism and urbanism, the untramelled growth of state power in the name of progress, or the unforseen devastation of the environment. In particular, the environmental movement, especially in India, has led to a resurgence of interest in Gandhi's critique of modernity. The critique of modernity may have been finally domesticated Indian nationalism, but it has not disappeared.

We propose to undertake two strategies to explain the differences in the weight and influence of anti-modem ideas in India and China among the intelligentsia and elites more widely. I wish to

IGNOURESULTS.COM

underline that my strategies refer particularly to the ways in which these politically active elites – the designers of these new nation-states – represent themselves and their visions of political community; they do not refer to some abstract entity such as Indian or Chinese political cultures. The first strategy will seek the possible institutional anchors for such anti-modernist perspectives in the different potitical cultures of these elites. This strategy will provide us with the necessary but not sufficient condition to explain the difference. The second strategy considers the particular ideological conjuncture in which Gandhian ideas emerged and took root. This had much to do with the specific circumstances of imperialism and modes of resistance in the two countries: with Gandhian resistance to direct British rule and the Chinese response first to indirect imperialism, and then the military and idedogical resistance to Japanese imperialism, The first strategy appeals to an argument for cultural difference in the way the elite was integrated with the polity, the second to differences in ideology and cultural strategies of resistance.

LinYu-sheng (1979) has argued that the totalistic iconoclasm of the May 4th movement was itself made possible by the organic unity between the cultural and political order in the Chinese imperial system. In this system, universal kingship integrated the cultural-moral order with the socio-political order. The collapse of this pivot in the system led to the collapse of the legtttmating principle of this elite's cultural-moral order, which subsequently enabled the totalistic attack on the traditional order. 4 There is a remarkably symmetrical argument made for Indian society by the lndologist Louis Dumont. Dumont (1980) argues that it is religious ideas, especially of hierarchy and pollution, and the Brahmin priesthood that held together the entire system, Kingship and politics, although protecting religion, was fundamentally dependent upon religious ideas and the ritual activities of the Brahmin priesthood for their legitimation, So where, in Lin's account, the cultural and moral, as well as the more broadly social sphere, were dependent upon the imperial institution for their legitimation, in Dumont's view of India, politics and society depended upon religious institutions and ideas, Thus in India, "religion encompassed the political", whereas in China, it was the political which encompassed the religious (or moral culture).

Both views may be criticized for essentializing complex cultural traditions, for reducing the enormous diversity of China and India to simple, and some would say, simplistic principles. I have found some value in their formulations as ways of understanding have elites perceived and integrated themselves with political power. Thus in Lin's formulation, we may better think of the organic unity as a representation which informed the world-view of the literati elite and upwardly mobile segments of society; as for Dumont, we need to qualify his assertion about religion sanctioning politics by the extent to which this relationship was relevant to the self-understanding of different, particularly lower-class, groups. By understanding these formulations as specific elite representations rather than as timeless cultural principles, we may also see how differently these elite representations have shaped the emergent nations in the two societies as the new sources of sovereign authority. In the comparative study that follows I turn to a study by Arjun Appadurai of the history of a south Indian kingdom and temple community from the 18th until the early 20th century. For the Chinese materials I will use my own researches and other materials from the north China plain in the 19th and 20th centuries. Appadurai's study of the Sri Partasarati Svami temple in Madras gives us a clear picture of how authority was constructed in this society. Before the British took over the area in the late 17th century, a triangular relationship obtained in the community between the kings, the sectarian

IGNOURESULTS.COM

priests of the temple and the temple community, the last of which also happened to be subjects of the kingdom. A set of transactions, material and symbolic, held the three together. Sovereignty lay actually with the deity of the temple. By providing royal gifts and protection (other patrons might giant more generous gifts, but could not provide protection) to the temple, the king, who demonstrated the highest form of service to the deity, came to share in the paradigmatic royalty of the deity, "By being the greatest servant of the deity, the human king sustains and displays his rule over men". Thus, the authority of the rulers in the kingdom was, in practice, crucially dependent upon their patronage of the temple.

Behind the conferral of these ritual honours land critical to the link between the temple community and the king and the royal bureaucracy, were, of cause, the sectarian managers of the temple who were also the religious leaders of the community. While the king was granted the authority to be the ultimate arbiter in temple disputes, the actual day to day, managerial authority of the temple community lay with these leaders; and the monarch could not encroach upon the prerogative. As Appadurai puts it, "the ceremonial exchanges of honour between warrior-kings and sectarian leaders rendered public, stable and culturally appropriate an exchange at the level of politics and economics. These warrior-kings bartered the control of agrarian resources gained by military prowess for access to the [symbolically] re-distributive processes of temples, which were controlled by sectarian leaders. Conversely, in their own struggles with each othersectarian leaders found the support of these warrior-kings timely and profitable". With the expansion of the colonial British state and the growth of its control over the most intimate spheres of life, especially in the late 19th century, this particular interaction of religious and political structures of authority fell away and the triangular relationship was replaced by a state-civil society model of authority. At the structural level, the British dispensed with temples as the authoritative basis of rule in south India. Moreover, reversing the pattern of the past, the colonial administration sought increasingly to control the day-to-day affairs of the temple, thereby encroaching upon the authority of the temple leaders and generating enormous conflict and unending litigation, The historic process we have outlined was an effort at classic state building – whereby the state attempts to appropriate the authority of local communities – albeit in the colonial context. What was the effect of this state-making upon the religious structures of authority? Needless to say, the old triangular relationship collapsed. Moreover, the authority of the sectarian leaders was being increasingly challenged. Yet, this temple and Hindu temples all over India continued to play a vital role in electoral politics, political mobilization, and politics in general. Control of temples continued to generate intense competition between local power-holders, their lawyers and publicists (Washbrook 1976). Cut off from state power, sectarian and Brahmin elites sought to reinforce their religious authority within the community and temple which continued to provide, as Appadumi argues, a last resort for working out political entitlement. Temple honours were not only valued cultural markers because they brought enhanced status to the recipient, but because they also brought control of temple resources, their followings and their allies. Thus the continued importance of religious institutions in the power and self-perception of an important segment of the Indian elite would ensure religious ideas a rote in the emergent narratives of the nation. Let us now consider the way in which religious and political structures of authority were articulated at the local level in China, both before and after the process of modern state-making took hold. In the villages of north China during the late 9th and early 20th centuries, patronage and management of the religious sphere of activity – endowing and managing temple lands, honour and repairing

IGNOURESULTS.COM

temples, organizing temple festivities, serving on temple management committees – clearly brought honour and status to those engaged in them. These activities were monopolized by the village elite, who in terms of leisure and resources, were best able to avail of them, In many villages these activities in the religious sphere provided the framework for managing the public affairs of the village, for instance, running the crop-watching association or the self-defence crops of the village. Moreover, in some villages, temple committees also functioned as the ultimate tribunal to judge offenders in the village under the watchful eyes of the gods. We have argued that the active role played by the village elite in the religious sphere was sanctioned by the cosmology of a uversa1 bureaucracy headed by the emperor but composed of both earthly and godly bureaucrats mediating the relationship between spiritual and temporal worlds (1989, 134 -136). The activities of this universal bureaucracy provided a model for leaders to present their authority and exercise their responsibilities. For whatever practical reasons the village elite performed their activities in the religious sphere, the bureaucrats' patronage of officially sanctioned gods and the gentry's sponsorship of both official and non-official gods communicated a clear message to them about the style and responsibilities of political leadership in society. It also alerts us to the way in which authority in the religious sphere at the local level was symbolically dependent on the pivotal role of universal emperorship and, more widely, on the ritual activities of the imperial bureaucracy. This is brought home most sharply when the modernizing state began to send a different message regarding the religious sphere in the villages and urged village leaders to transfer their allegiance from the religious realm to the more secular activities of the modern regime

At the turn of the 20th century, the provincial administration of Zhili and Shandong under the initial leadership of Yua Shikai (or Yuan Shih-Kai) sought to implement a series of modernizing reforms at the village level and target the old religious sphere as the source of 'superstition" and also substantial resources. The success of this administration in appropriating temple and temple property was not inconsiderable (Duara 1999, 148 -155). This was due largely to cooperation by the village elites who saw new channels of social mobility in the schools, titles and programmes which came down to the village came from a national authority. These resources functioned to certify and bolster the authority of the village elite who monopolized official positions in this initial period (Duara 1989, 157). In other words, the rural elite turned wt to be extremely adaptive and responsive to state demands: they were able to transfer their allegiances from the religious sphere to the secular relatively painlessly. They were able to do so because for them it had been the political within the religious that had been salient in the first place. The religious domain had ceased to be a factor in the political role of the elite any more.

What does this comparative excursus tell us about the greater prominence of critiques of modernity in India? Surely not the simplistic conclusion that religion is necessarily anti-modern. Religion, in and of itself, is scarcely incompatible with modernity as the increasingly popular role of religion in the US, Japan or Taiwan reveals. In China, the areas which have prospered most in recent years, such as the south and southeast coast, have also witnessed a massive religious revival. I believe it tells us that where elites locate their authority outside of the political power of the state, which often tends to be in organized religions, they are able not only to generate opposition, but also to articulate alternative narratives to the authoritative discourse located within this political power. Thus, a state-building programme in India did not foreclose, and may even have contributed to the expansion of a space within which certain elite groups could engage in an indigenous critique of the narrative of History associated with the colonial

IGNOURESULTS.COM

power. This is also how we can understand the force of Gandhi's resistance to granting moral authority to the state.

In China since universal kingship encompassed the religious and moral order, the source of authority for local elites as well as intelligentsia resided principally in the political. We have seen how the pivotal role of the political shaped the allegiance of the elite at even the most local levels of rural society. The collapse of the political pivot which made possible the radical iconoclasm of the May 4th movement also de-legitimated critiques of the emergent order originating in the non-modern sectors of society. Non-modem and non-elite popular religious movements, such as those led by the Small Sword Society (see Duara 1995, Ch. 3), continued to flourish and challenge the hegemonic discourse especially as it pertained to popular religion. However, lacking links with the modern intelligentsia, they were unable to articulate a counter-narrative of dissent that was acceptable in the public domain. The relative autonomy of religious authority in India enabled a man like Gandhi to be as influential as he was. But it would be a mistake to identify Gandhi entirely with the project of the 19th century Hindu elite who sought to found the nation in the idea of a "spiritual culture" in opposition to History. Stephen Hay has revealed how the entire 19th century Hindu renaissance was the work overwhelmingly of Brahmins in Bengal and South India. It was also largely the celebration of the high Brahminc philosophical tradition of the Vedas and the Upanishads. While at one level, Gandhi, a non-Brahmin, drew from this tradition, Ashis Nandy (1987, 155-8) points out that at another level, he marked a break with this tradition because Gandhi's Hinduism affirmed the non-canonical and the folk. While this may make him similar to the Chinese nativists in search of traditional roots of a modern, national culture, yet we should recall that for Gandhi it was often the non-modern within these folk traditions that he valued. Gandhi's critique of modernity derived its legitimacy in substantial part from the popular, sectarian religious traditions which continued to play a vital part in Saurashtra, the area he came from. This comer of Gujarat was an area of eclectic and competing religious cultures including ascetic Jainism and Christianity and his family was strongly influenced by the devotional tradition of monotheistic Hinduism of bhakti. It was from this tradition that he derived his opposition to classical, caste-bound Hinduism and projected a religious nationalism based on non-violence and compassion. Most of all, the bhakti tradition gave him an orientation and style. By following in the path of bhakti teachers, walking about the land preaching his message, Gandhi, the latter-day saint, was able to reach out to the ordinary people (Rudolphs 139, 172).

If the continued meaningfulness of religious traditions among segments of the elite leadership of the national movement in India created a space and an audience for the critique of modernity, the substance of Gandhi's critique itself was not a necessary outcome of this space. The substance must be understood in the context of his encounter with colonial ideology. Ashis Nandy (1983) has argued that the psychological impact of colonial ideology is much more devastating and longer lasting than its political or economic effect. This impact is felt both in the colonized society as well as in the colonizing society. The justification of world colonization by Western powers required the construction of an ideology of rule that not only transformed the representation of the colonized peoples, but also recast the self-image of Western society as one that was quintessentially and definitionally the antithesis of the East, In the Indian context, the "natives; were marked variously as cowardly, effeminate, naively childlike, superstitious, ignorant and the like. In turn the West was characterized by the images of youthfulness, aggressiveness, and mastery exemplified so well in the British public school. In doing so, it

IGNOURESULTS.COM

repressed many of the antinomian Dionysian features of Western society itself, such as femininity, childlikeness, passiveness, the positive qualities of age, at great psychological cost to this society, Nandy examines the crippling effects of this ideology on those at the interface of the encounter such as Rudyard Kipling, E. M. Forster and CF. Andrews, on the one side, and westernized Indians such as Aurobindo Ghosh on the other.

Gandhi was among the very few elite Indians to successfully resist the colonial representation of the Indian. In my opinion, upper caste Hindu reformers tended to respond to the colonial psychological onslaught with a myopic defensiveness of a reconstructed Hindu spirituality (versus Western materiality) – itself an Odentalist representation, albeit with positive connotations. Partly in consequence of this defensiveness, Hindu elites have been much more closed to the kind of self-criticism that characterized May 4th intellectuals in China. Gandhi was able to break through this defensiveness and, according to Nandy, resist the linkages at the root of colonial ideology between progressive mastery at the heart of History on the one hand, and racism, hyper-masculinity and adulthood on the other (Nandy 1983, 100). His doctrine of passive resistance and non-violence sought to liberate activism and courage from aggressiveness and recognize them as perfectly compatible with womanhood. Keenly aware of the disfiguring effects of colonialism on the British themselves he pointed to the abandonment of true Christian values which, he believed, could never justify colonialism.

But (and this is not part of Nandy's argument) Gandhi appears to have taken a final step of equating the irrationality and immorality of colonialism with that of modernity as a whole. So deeply implicated were the categories of modern thought with colonial ideology that to accept the Western criterion of a true antagonist – to be a player in the game of "modernization" - would be to violate one's own being, to remain imprisoned within the deforming categories of the other.

Thus the sufficient condition enabling Gandhi's critique of modernity lay in the encounter with colonial ideology and his ability to provide a psychologically valid alternative to it in his nationalism, especially for a middle class caught awkwardly between two worlds. in China, the imperialist presence was of course widely resented and anti-imperialism was at the core of political movements for the first half of the 20th century. But the absence of institutionalized colonialism in most parts of China also meant that colonial ideology was not entrenched among both colonizer and colonized in the same way as it was in India and other directly colonized countries. The opposition to imperialism was chiefly political and economic and did not present the urgent need to root out imperialist ideology in the very self-perception of a people, It is interesting to speculate on the rote and effects of Japanese colonial discourse in the early 20th century. As far as l know, few scholars have taken up this subject seriously. However, work seeking to understand the Japanese construction of History and the Orient is beginning to emerge, most notably, Stefan Tanaka's Japan's Orient (see also James Fujii, 1993). At the centre of Tanaka's concern is the Meiji production of foyoshi (literally, Eastern History), a historical narrative of great consequence for East Asia. From our perspective, toyoshi combined linear History with the oppositional discourse of 'culture" In a way that Japan could resist the hierarchies of universal History and thus establish its equivalence to the West and yet create its own superiority in relation to the rest of Asia, particularly China which came to be designated in this discourse as Shins. As the foundation of an alternative History, the East was idealized (or Orientalized) and for figures like Okakura Tenshin, Japan's mission lay in re-entering the Asiatic past and regaining the lost beauty of Asia. The dominant academic trend, however,

IGNOURESULTS.COM

tended to objectify Shina as Japan's past, as a temporal inferior, even while claiming some of the timeless qualities of Asiatic ideals as being embodied in modern Japan (Tanaka 1993, 19). While it is important to recognize the indeterminacy of toyoshi discourse and the fact that it inspired many Japanese to reach out to other Asians to build a positive future, nonetheless, there was, even amongst the most noble-minded of these figures, a paternalism towards Japan's Orient that seeded the violent appropriation of this discourse by Japanese imperialism (Tanaka 1993, Ch. 5). From the outset, then, it would appear that Japanese colonial ideology took a different approach to its colonial subjects that would have made a Gandhian type of response inappropriate, if not meaningless. In proclaiming the establishment of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere as the mission of Japanese rule in the 1930s and 1940s the Japanese imperialists were appealing to the Orientalism of toyoshi which celebrated an Asiatic unity. Idyllic village communities based upon the spirit of age-old cooperation were to be the building blocks of the Japanese empire which was the only force capable of resisting the corrupting influences of Western capitalism. (Hatada 1976, 10-15) Although there was a world of difference between Gandhi and the Japanese imperialists, nonetheless, the basis of a critique founded upon alternative Asian values which Gandhi also espoused was arguably extremely suspect in China.

In a recent forum on my 1995 book, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China (Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 29, July-October), John Fitzgerald comments on an earlier version of this paper. Fitzgerald examines the internalization of Western imperialist images of the smelly, wily, emasculated and inscrutable Chinese among a large number of Chinese novelists and politicians of the early 20th century, and concludes that the sources of Chinese and Indian self-images in Orientalism were perhaps not so different after, all. His alternative view is that what was different was "the relatives a 'new with which Chinese nationalists accepted the colonial representations of John Chinaman as the foundation for fashioning a 'new kind of people'..." in contrast to Indian nationalists. I agree with Fitzgerald's judgement and believe that it advances our conclusion a step further. Apart from exceptional individuals like Gandhi, the self-image of middle-class Indians was made, in significant part, from both the positive and negative stereotypes of imperialist Orientalism. Yet Indian nationalism (and not necessarily the movement) tended to use the positive Orientalism as a shield to deflect serious self-examination that might have been provoked by the negative Orientalism. It still, however, begs the question as to why Indian nationalists found it difficult to explore and act upon this criticism.

Why this relative lack of "ease" among Indians, has, I sense as one with no expertise in psychology, to do with the presence or absence of everyday, colonial rulership, whether in India, Korea orAlgeria. Although this does not hold for every person or even every group in the colonized society, the strongly dualistic or Manichaean relationship between colonialism and nationalism makes it very difficult for these nationalists and intellectuals to be self-critical in the May 4th way. The space for self- examination is often filled by a defence mechanism that sanctifies the self-or a part of the self. One might make the argument that this is the reaction of only bourgeois nationalists and it is true that they probably have a greater stake in the status quo than many others. But a cursory look at multicultural politics in contemporary America reveals a recognizably similar process that suggests that it might also have, to do with the everyday confrontation of identities constructed as self and other. The ability to criticize the Self demands some distance from a powerful, objectifying Other, or perhaps it demands the Other

IGNOURESULTS.COM

principally as an internalized Self, which provides a curious autonomy from a real Other standing over the Self. At the same time, however, this self-criticism – while valuable as a practice – is, of course, no guarantee of liberation.
To return to the exceptional Gandhi. It is perhaps inevitable that, with widely varying degrees of destructiveness, all of our representations imply normative hierarchies which tend to marginalize and repress peoples and cultures. Is Gandhi relevant to understanding how and why to keep our dialogue open to the Other?
My answer is a yes and a no. Gandhi's contribution was to demonstrate that it may be possible to bring vast masses of people into the political mainstream without the same violent or wrenching transformation of their self-image that 19th century imperialism had produced among the intelligentsia: to locate the sources of self-empowerment (swaraj) not only in an external or elite discourse but within the best in their popular traditions: and to project an ideology that minimized the instrumentalization of the people with whom he worked. In these respects he also resembled grass-roots reformers in China like Jimmy Yan and Liang Shuming for whom the transformative impulse was balanced by the need to preserve the local as a value, even though he was much more politically popular than were they.
In preserving the local – here religious traditions in relation to the modernizing center – as a value, Gandhi was able to transform it into a space from which the dominant ideology of the state could be critiqued – a space similar in many ways to civil society in the West. We tend not to equate religious space with civil society because the enlightenment project was directed against the authority of the church. If. however, we may step aside from the history of modern Europe and seek our perspective from political developments for democratization in East Europe, Latin America, the Philippines and elsewhere, then we have to recognize that the critique of state and state ideologies has come from the authority provided by religious sources such as the Catholic church and Liberation Theology.
The narrative of emancipatory modernity in China has its power because it has elicited the commitment of both the Chinese state and the modern intelligentsia. Its gains for the Chinese people in many areas of life cannot go unappreciated. Moreover, despite my criticism of the Chinese intelligentsia's representation of me "people", I believe that the highly elitist Indian intelligentsia and bureaucracy (outside of the Gandhian safyagrahi and some activist groups) can learn much from Chinese egalitarianism. Yet the consuming commitment of Chinese intellectuals to the narrative of modemiiy has tended to produce a monologism in which gradualist reformers like Liang Shuming, Jimmy Yan, Tao Xingzhi and others (each of whom could perhaps have played the role of a Gandhi under different circumstances) have been marginalized. In the process, this narrative has obscured the vitality of popular culture, religion and their associational life, and de-legitimated the critique of modern ideologies originating outside of modern discourses. Despite the repeated persecution of the intelligentsia by the Chinese state, it is this shared narrative which has thrown so many of them repeatedly into the arms of the state and at the same time alienated both from the living cultures of the "masses" and of "tradition". While the state has made effective use of the narrative of modernity to expand its own powers, the Chinese intelligentsia has robbed itself of alternative sources of moral authority which it might have found in history and popular culture.
At the same time, Gandhi's success in politicizing the people was also limited by the fact that his politics were a meditation on the methodology of morality. We may think of his mission as the production of a self that was less epistemologically controlling, but morally self-aware and self-

IGNOURESULTS.COM

controlled. Indeed, such was his dedication to this disciplinary project, that it became its own totalization and took its own toll. This totalizing impulse is also reflected in his utopianism which was so radically oppositional that it reproduced the essentializing quality of modernity which he sought to fight. Thus by conflating colonialism with modernity as a single, given mode of being, he objectified it and did not attend to the historical tensions within that could unravel it. How would Gandhi have accounted for pacificist traditions in modern society, for the power of the environmental movement, for the increased visibility of androgyny, for the "age revolution"? Gandhi did not recognize that any de-construction of a system of ideas must also fall prey to this system. To put it more affirmatively, "it is a question of explicitly and systematically posing the problem of the status of a discourse which borrows from a heritage the resources necessary for the de-construction of that heritage itself" (Derrida 1978, 282).

In not posing the problem of his affiliation with that which he critiqued, Gandhi could not see that the transcendent Truth which his conception of the nation sought to embody was exactly parallel to the nation as the subject of transcendent History, an essence which remained even as all tangible histories were re-written, dispersed or died out. In seeking to banish History as the foundation of the nation, Gandhi banished historicity itself and ended up with a transcendental ideal, the more impossible to realize. As historians, our task is to displace History, but at the same time, to rescue history, We do so with the knowledge that the nation cannot be essentialized as a transcendent reality, beyond self-serving regimes and bickering interest groups. The nation exists as representations of community inseparable from these very groups pursuing their partialities but also embodying their larger aspirations in, narratives of transcendence. As representation, the nation also conceals itself as a relationship of power which uses its political and rhetorical apparatuses to suppress alternative visions of community. The nation as representation and power has been well served by History and Truth. The real historical nation is an elusive relationship which can only be understood by marshaling all; the resources that history has to offer.

Q. What is the condition of Indian villages?

Ans. In August, the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) released the All India Rural Financial Inclusion Survey, 2016-17. It has revealing data about the worsening situation of farmers and villages across India. The survey shows that the average monthly income of rural households in India is `8,059. For agricultural households in rural areas, it is `8,931, whereas for non-agricultural households, it is just `7,269. Further, we find agricultural households get hardly 43 per cent of their income from agriculture and allied activities such as animal husbandry, while the rest comes from wage labour and salaries from government and private services. Non-agricultural households get much of their income from wages and salaries from government and non-government jobs. They get hardly 11. 7 per cent of their income from enterprises. And overall, rural households get hardly 23 per cent of their income from agriculture and allied activities, with 67. 1 per cent of their income coming from wages and salaries from government and non-government jobs and hardly 8. 4 per cent from other enterprises. This data shows the meagreness of income from agriculture even in rural areas and also that only a very small percentage of rural income is from enterprises other than agriculture. According to the NABARD survey, there were 21. 17 crore households in rural areas in 2016-17; out of this, 10. 07 crore or 48 per cent are agricultural households. According to the 2011 Census, 68. 8 per cent of India's population lives in rural areas. Assuming the population

IGNOURESULTS.COM

grows at the rate of 1. 6 per cent per annum, the estimated population for 2016-17 would be 131. 3 crores and assuming rural population to be 68. 8 per cent of the total, the total population in rural areas would be 90. 3 crores. Given there are 21. 17 crore rural households, the average family size in rural areas would be 4. 27. The total annual income of rural households in 2016-17 would be only `20. 5 lakh crore. In 2016-17, total national income on current prices as per CSO data was `135 lakh crore. If we subtract rural income from this total, the urban areas' income would be `114. 5 lakh crore. If we calculate per capita income in rural areas, it would be `22,702 annually. On the other hand, the per capita income in urban areas would be over a whopping `2,79,000 annually. This indicates that per capita income in urban areas is over 12. 2 times that in rural areas; it was nine times that in rural areas just a few years ago. The rising rural-urban gap is not only a cause of concern for policymakers, but also presents a challenge for the nation. The rising disparity is becoming a major cause of increasing poverty and unemployment in rural areas, resulting in large-scale migration to urban areas. The extent of rising agriculture distress is further indicated by the fact that the portion of GDP coming from agriculture, which used to be 55 per cent in 1951, came down to 25 per cent in 1991 and to hardly 17. 3 per cent in 2016-17. The worsening situation in rural areas as depicted by GDP data is supported by the NABARD survey, which says that hardly 23 per cent of rural household income comes from agriculture. Now people living in villages are earning a majority of their income from wages or from government or private jobs in cities and not from farming and allied activities. Villagers do earn wages from work on farms, or from other works including the Mahatma Gandhi Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. In addition, home construction plan for the rural poor is also providing work to rural workers, including the landless. The rural people also get incomes from salaries from government and private jobs. However, the wide gap between rural and urban incomes calls for major policy initiatives, before the situation becomes explosive. The Narendra Modi government has set a target to double the incomes of farmers by 2022. According to the NABARD survey, the total number of agricultural households is 10. 07 crores. Since the average family size is 4. 27, the total agricultural population would be 43 crores. The government has decided to provide a minimum support price for agriculture produce by adding at least 50 per cent to the cost of production to raise the incomes of farmers, improve irrigation and reduce cost by cheapening of input cost for farming. However, the target of doubling farmers' incomes would apply to only 43 crore people, which is 48 per cent of rural population. For improving the condition of all rural inhabitants, we need to make efforts to help non-agricultural rural households as well, whose condition is much worse as seen earlier from the average monthly incomes. To improve their condition we need to generate employment opportunities in villages in food processing industry, animal husbandry, poultry, fishing, mushroom production, bamboo products development and other non-agricultural activities. Loans are available to farmers at subsidised rates, and even at zero rate of interest rate in many states; similar loans can be provided to landless people in rural areas for these allied and non-farm activities. Lately, the government has extended Kisan Credit Card (KCC) facility to those engaged in animal husbandry and fishing; the same has to be extended to other rural non-farm activities. We must understand that flushing people out of rural areas is no solution to the rural distress; we need to provide them employment at their doorstep. It was a scheme meant to electrify India. Instead, it generated tall promises that fell way short of expectations. Though UPA government's Rupees 400 crore, high profile Bharat Nirman media campaign boasted that it had changed the face of rural India by providing electrification under the Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana

IGNOURESULTS.COM

(RGGVY), it turned out to be a chimera. A CAG report tabled in parliament in February had found loopholes in conceptualization and implementation of the scheme. The actual achievements would be less, it alleged, because figures on ‘estimates’ and ‘targets’ were based on “faulty, unreliable data”. According to the report, “against the targeted coverage of 1,23,601 unelectrified villages and 4,12,88,438 rural households, including 2,30,10,265 BPL (Below Poverty Line) households, only 1,04,496 unelectrified villages (84. 54 percent) and 2,15,04,430 rural households (52. 08 percent) including 1,90,80,115 BPL households (82. 92 percent) have been covered by March 31, 2012. Actual achievement would need to be viewed against the fact that the scheme was beset with the problems (unverified, not updated data). ”There were flaws in implementing the project as the agencies responsible failed to fully utilize the allocated budgets. The CAG report revealed that the estimated expenditure between 2004 and 2012 by the Minis-try of Power (MoP), the nodal agency for implementing the project, was `27,488. 56 crore. But it released `26,150. 76 crore to the Rural Electrification Corporation (REC) till March 2012. The Project Implementation Agency (PIA), appointed by REC, utilized only `22,510. 14 crore till May 20, 2012.

A Scheme gone awry: The rural electrification plan was launched in 2005 with a target to reach all villages by 2009. But even after the extension of the dates, the goal is yet to be achieved. On September 2, 2013, MoP issued guidelines for the extension of the scheme into the 12th (2012-17) and 13th (2017-2022) five year plans. Electricity connections have been given to 52 percent of the rural households, but only for consumption of a single unit daily. That can light only a 40-watt bulb for a day. The CAG report was an indictment of this much-publicized scheme. “Despite an implementation approach characterized by rushed approvals and involvement of numerous stakeholders, the objectives of providing access to electricity to all, giving electricity connection free of cost to every un-electrified BPL and electrifying every un-electrified village habitation by 2009 had not been achieved,” it said. The formulation of the scheme was flawed, as identification of villages and estimation of beneficiaries was based on unreliable data. As per MoP, a village is classified as electrified if it fulfils three conditions: (i) basic infrastructure, such as distribution transformer and distribution lines are provided in the inhabited locality as well as the Dalit basti; (ii) electricity is provided to public places like schools, panchayat offices, health centers, dispensaries, community centers, etc; and (iii) the number of households electrified is at least 10 percent of the total in the village.

Poor execution: The CAG report said there were instances where guidelines were not followed, such as authenticated BPL lists and rural electrification plans not being in place. RGGVY projects were planned without adequate survey, and detailed project reports were based on old data. “Project implementation was beset with slow execution of work, idle investments, weak monitoring, non-fulfilment of commitments made in agreements, delays in award of contracts and non-handling and overcharging of completed works,” the report said. It laid the blame at the doorstep of contractors, PIA and REC, but said that accountability for this delay was not determined at any level. Due to this, the Liability Damage clause was rendered irrelevant. Ramasamy Murugesan, associate professor, Centre for Rural Infrastructure, National Institute of Rural Development, Hyderabad, agrees with this assessment. “I have travelled to several villagers to study RGGVY and it has not matched up to expectations. In states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, the problem is aggravated due to poor infrastructure,” he explains. The scheme was well-meant but ambitious. RGGVY envisioned that various rural agencies would indirectly facilitate power requirement of agriculture and other activities, such as irrigation

IGNOURESULTS.COM

pump sets, small and medium industries, khadi and village industries, cold chains, healthcare, education and IT. This, it felt, would facilitate overall rural development and lead to employment generation and poverty alleviation. But all that remains a pipe dream. However, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi's promise that his government will be committed to the poor sections of society, one hopes that the CAG report will be taken up seriously and implemented, and rural electrification will no longer remain a distant dream in India.

Q. What is the interpretation and reality of India's civilization and culture?

Ans. **Society and culture**: Apart from the political events of the time, a common development in the subcontinent was the recognizable decentralization of administration and revenue collection. From the Cola kingdom there are long inscriptions on temple walls referring to the organization and functioning of village councils. Villages that had been donated to Brahmans had councils called sabhas; in the non-Brahman villages the council was called the ur. Eligibility qualifications generally relating to age and ownership of property were indicated, along with procedural rules. The council was divided into various committees in charge of the different aspects of village life and administration. Among the responsibilities of the council was the collection of revenue and the supervision of irrigation. References to village bodies and local councils also occur in inscriptions from other regions. A more recent and much-contested view held by some historians holds that the Cola state was a segmentary state with control decreasing from the centre outward and a ritual hierarchy that determined the relations between the centre and the units of the territory. The nature of the state during this period has been the subject of widespread discussion among historians. In the Deccan the rise and fall of dynasties was largely the result of the feudatory pattern of political relationships. The same held true of northern India and is seen both in the rise of various Rajput dynasties and in their inability to withstand the Turkish invasions. There is considerable controversy among historians as to whether it would be accurate to describe the feudatory pattern as feudalism per se. Some argue that, although it was not identical to the classic example of feudalism in western Europe, there are sufficient similarities to allow the use of the term. Others contend that the dissimilarities are substantial, such as the apparent absence of an economic contract involving king, vassal, and serf. In any event, the patterns of land relations, politics, and culture changed considerably, and the major characteristic of the change consists of forms of decentralization. The commonly used term for a feudatory was samanta, which designated either a conquered ruler or a secular official connected with the administration who had been given a grant of land in lieu of a salary and who had asserted ownership over the land and gradually appropriated rights of ruling the area. There were various categories of samantas. As long as a ruler was in a feudatory status, he called himself samanta and acknowledged his overlord in official documents and charters. Independent status was indicated by the elimination of the title of samanta and the inclusion instead of royal titles such as maharaja and maharatadhiraja. The feudatory had certain obligations to the ruler. Although virtually in sole control administratively and fiscally over the land granted to him, he nevertheless had to pay a small percentage of the revenue to the ruler and maintain a specified body of troops for him. He was permitted the use of certain symbols of authority on formal occasions and was required, if called upon, to give his daughter in marriage to his suzerain. These major administrative and economic changes, although primarily concerning fiscal arrangements and revenue organization, also had their impact on politics and culture. The grantees or intermediaries in a hierarchy of grants were not merely secular officials

IGNOURESULTS.COM

but were often Brahman beneficiaries who had been given grants of land in return for religious services rendered to the state. The grants were frequently so lucrative that the Brahmans could marry into the families of local chiefs, which explains the presence of Brahman ancestors in the genealogies of the period.

The economy: Cultivation was still carried out by the peasants, generally Shudras, who remained tied to the land. Since the revenue was now to be paid not to the king but to the samanta, the peasants naturally began to give more attention to his requirements. Although the samantas copied the life-style of the royal court, often to the point of setting up miniature courts in imitation of the royal model, the system also encouraged parochial loyalties and local cultural interests. One manifestation of this local involvement was a sudden spurt of historical literature such as Bilhana's Vikramankadevacarita, the life of the Calukya king Vikramaditya VI, and Kalhana's Rajatarangini, a history of Kashmir. The earlier decline in trade was gradually reversed in this period, with trade centres emerging in various parts of the subcontinent. Some urban centres developed from points of exchange for agrarian produce, whereas others were involved in long-distance trade. In some cases, traders from elsewhere settled in India, such as the Arabs on the Malabar Coast; in other cases Indian traders went to distant lands. Powerful trading guilds could enjoy political and military support, as was the case during the Cola monarchy. Even the rich Hindu temples of southern India invested their money in trade. Pala contacts were mainly with Srivijaya, and trade was combined with Buddhist interests. The monasteries at Nalanda and Vikramashila maintained close relations. By now eastern India was the only region with a sizable Buddhist presence. The traditional trade routes were still used, and some kingdoms drew their revenue from such routes as those along the Aravalli Range, Malava, and the Chambal and Narmada valleys. Significantly, the major technological innovation, the introduction of the sāqiyah (Persian wheel), or araghatta, as an aid to irrigation in northern India, pertains to agrarian life and not to urban technology.

Social mobility: Historians once believed that the post-Gupta period brought greater rigidity in the caste structure and that this rigidity was partially responsible for the inability of Indians to face the challenge of the Turks. This view is now being modified. The distinctions, particularly between the Brahmans and the other castes, were in theory sharper, but in practice it now appears that social restrictions were not so rigid. Brahmans often lived off the land and founded dynasties. Most of the groups claiming Kshatriya status had only recently acquired it. The conscious reference to being Kshatriya, a characteristic among Rajputs, is a noticeable feature in post-Gupta politics. The fact that many of these dynasties were of obscure origin suggests some social mobility: a person of any caste, having once acquired political power, could also acquire a genealogy connecting him with the traditional lineages and conferring Kshatriya status. A number of new castes, such as the Kayasthas (scribes) and Khatris (traders), are mentioned in the sources of this period. According to the Brahmanic sources, they originated from intercaste marriages, but this is clearly an attempt at rationalizing their rank in the hierarchy. Many of these new castes played a major role in society. The hierarchy of castes did not have a uniform distribution throughout the country. But the preeminent position of the Brahman was endorsed not merely by the fact that many had lands and investments but also by the fact that they controlled education. Formal learning was virtually restricted to the institutions attached to the temples. Technical knowledge was available in the various artisan guilds. Hierarchy existed, however, even among the Brahmans; some Brahman castes, who had perhaps been tribal priests

IGNOURESULTS.COM

before being assimilated into the Sanskritic tradition, remained ordinary village priests catering to the day-to-day religious functions.

Religion: The local nucleus of the new culture led to a large range of religious expression, from the powerful temple religion of Brahmanism to a widespread popular bhakti religion and even more widespread fertility cults. The distinctions between the three were not clearly demarcated in practice; rites and concepts from each flowed into the other. The formal worship of Vishnu and Shiva had the support of the elite. Temples dedicated to Vaishnava and Shaiva deities were the most numerous. But also included were some of the chief deities connected with the fertility cult, and the mother goddesses played an important role. The Puranas had been rewritten to incorporate popular religion; now the upa-puranas were written to record rites and worship of more-localized deities. Among the more-popular incarnations of Vishnu was Krishna, who, as the cowherd deity, accommodated pastoral and erotic themes in worship. The love of Krishna and Radha was expressed in sensitive and passionate poetry. The introduction of the erotic theme in Hinduism was closely connected with the fertility cult and Tantrism. The latter, named for its scriptures, the Tantras, influenced both Hindu and Buddhist ritual. Tantrism, as practiced by the elite, represented the conversion of a widespread folk religion into a sophisticated one. The emphasis on the mother goddess, related to that expressed in the Shakti (Śakti) cult, strengthened the status of the female deities. The erotic aspect also was related to the importance of ritual coition in some Tantric rites. The depiction of erotic scenes on temple walls therefore had a magico-religious context. Vajrayana Buddhism, current in eastern India, Nepal, and Tibet, shows evidence of the impact of Tantrism. The goddess Tara emerges as the saviour and is in many ways the Buddhist counterpart of Shakti. Buddhism was on the way out—the Buddha had been incorporated as an avatar of Vishnu—and had lost much of its popular appeal, which had been maintained by the simple habits of the monks. The traditional source of Buddhist patronage had dwindled with declining trade. Jainism, however, managed to maintain some hold in Rajasthan, Gujarat, and Karnataka. The protest aspect of both Buddhism and Jainism, especially the opposition to Brahmanic orthodoxy, had now been taken over by the Tantrists and the bhakti cults. The Tantrists expressed their protest through some rather extreme rites, as did some of the heretical sects such as the Kalamukhas and Kapalikas. The bhakti cults expressed the more-puritanical protest of the urban groups, gradually spreading to the rural areas. Preeminent among the bhakti groups during this period were the Lingayats, or Virashaivas, who were to become a powerful force in Karnataka, and the Pandharpur cult in Maharashtra, which attracted such preachers as Namadeva and Jnaneshvara.

Literature and the arts: It was also in the matha (monastery) and the ghatika (assembly hall), attached to the temples, that the influential philosophical debates were conducted in Sanskrit. Foremost among the philosophers were Shankara (8th–9th century), Ramanuja (d. 1137), and Madhva (13th century). The discussions centred on religious problems, such as whether knowledge or devotion was the more effective means of salvation, and problems of metaphysics, including that of the nature of reality. Court literature, irrespective of the region, continued to be composed in Sanskrit, with the many courts competing for the patronage of the poets and the dramatists. There was a revival of interest in earlier literature, generating copious commentaries on prosody, grammar, and technical literature. The number of lexicons increased, perhaps necessitated by the growing use of Sanskrit by non-Sanskrit speakers. Literary style tended to be pedantic and imitative, although there were notable exceptions, such as Jayadeva's lyrical poem on the love of Radha and Krishna, the Gitagovinda. The bhakti teachers preached in

IGNOURESULTS.COM

the local languages, giving a tremendous stimulus to literature in these languages. Adaptations of the Ramayana, Mahabharata, and Bhagavadgita were used regularly by the bhakti teachers. There was thus a gradual breaking away from Sanskrit and the Prakrit languages via the Apabhrahmsha language and the eventual emergence and evolution of such languages as Kannada, Telugu, Marathi, Gujarati, Bengali, and Oriya and of the Bihari languages. The period was rich in sculpture, in both stone and metal, each region registering a variant style. Western India and Rajasthan emphasized ornateness, with the Jain temples at Mount Abu attaining a perfection of rococo. Nalanda was the centre of striking but less-ornate images in black stone and of Buddhist bronze icons. Central Indian craftsmen used the softer sandstone. In the peninsula the profusely sculptured rock-cut temples such as the Kailasa at the Ellora Caves, under Calukya and Rashtrakuta patronage, displayed a style of their own. The dominant style in the south was that of Cola sculpture, particularly in bronze. The severe beauty and elegance of these bronze images, mainly of Shaiva and Vaishnava deities and saints, remains unsurpassed. A new genre of painting that rose to popularity in Nepal, eastern India, and Gujarat was the illustration of Buddhist and Jain manuscripts with miniature paintings. Temple architecture was divided into three main styles—nagara, dravida, and vasara—which were distinguished by the ground plan of the temple and by the shape of the shikhara (tower) that rose over the garbhagrha (cubical structure) and that became the commanding feature of temple architecture. The north Indian temples conformed to the nagara style, as is seen at Osian (Rajasthan state); Khajuraho (Madhya Pradesh state); and Konarka, Bhubaneshwar, and Puri (Orissa state). The Orissa temples, however, remain nearest to the original archetype. South Indian temple architecture, or dravida, style—with its commanding gopuras (gateways)—can be seen in the Rajarajeshvara and the Gangaikondacolapuram temples. The Deccani style, vasara, tended to be an intermixture of the northern and the southern, with early examples at Vatapi, Aihole, and Pattadakal and, later, at Halebid, Belur, and Somnathpur in the vicinity of Mysore. The wealth of the temples made them the focus of attack from plunderers. The question that is frequently posed as to why the Turks so easily conquered northern India and the Deccan has in part to do with what might be called the medieval ethos. A contemporary observed that the Indians had become self-centred and unaware of the world around them. This was substantially true. There was little interest in the politics of neighbouring countries or in their technological achievements. The medieval ethos expressed itself not only in the "feudatory" attitude toward politics and the parochial concerns that became dominant and prevented any effective opposition to the Turks but also in the trappings of chivalry and romanticism that became central to elite activity. It has been generally held that the medieval period of Indian history began with the arrival of the Turks (dated to either 1000 or 1206 CE), because the Turks brought with them a new religion, Islam, which changed Indian society at all levels. Yet the fundamental changes that took place about the 8th century, when the medieval ethos was introduced, would seem far more significant as criteria. Romila Thapar

The early Muslim period: North India under Muslim hegemony, c. 1200–1526. The first Muslim raids in the subcontinent were made by Arabs on the western coast and in Sind during the 7th and 8th centuries, and there had been Muslim trading communities in India at least since that time. The significant and permanent military movement of Muslims into northern India, however, dates from the late 12th century and was carried out by a Turkish dynasty that arose indirectly from the ruins of the ʿAbbāsid caliphate. The road to conquest was prepared by Sultan Maḥmūd of Ghazna (now Ghaznī, Afg.), who conducted more than 20 raids into north

IGNOURESULTS.COM

India between 1001 and 1027 and established in the Punjab the easternmost province of his large but short-lived empire. Maḥmūd's raids, though militarily successful, primarily had as their object taking plunder rather than conquering territory. Early Muslim India (c. 1200–c. 1500).

The Delhi sultanate: The decline of the Ghaznavids after 1100 was accentuated by the sack of Ghazna by the rival Shansabānīs of Ghūr in 1150–51. The Ghūrids, who inhabited the region between Ghazna and Herāt, rose rapidly in power during the last half of the 12th century, partly because of the changing balance of power that resulted from the westward movement of the non-Muslim Qara Khiṭāy (Karakitai) Turks into the area dominated by the Seljuq Turks, who had been the principal power in Iran and parts of Afghanistan during the previous 50 years. The Seljuq defeat in 1141 led to a struggle for power among the Qara Khiṭāy, the Khwārezm-Shahs, and the Ghūrids for control of parts of Central Asia and Iran. By 1152 Ghazna had been captured again by the Ghūrid ruler, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn. After his death the Ghūrid territory was partitioned principally between his two nephews, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad and Muʿizz al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Sām, commonly called Muḥammad of Ghūr. Ghiyāth al-Dīn ruled over Ghūr from Fīrūz-Kūh and looked toward Khorāsān, while Muḥammad of Ghūr was established in Ghazna and began to try his luck in India for expansion. The Ghūrid invasions of north India were thus extensions of a Central Asian struggle. Almost all of north India was, however, already in contact with Ghūr through extensive trade, particularly in horses. The Ghūrids were well known as horse breeders. Ghūr also had a reputation for supplying Indian and Turkish slaves to the markets of Central Asia. Muslim merchants and saints had settled much beyond Sind and the Punjab in a number of towns in what are now Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The Ghūrids also were familiar with the fabulous wealth of western and central India. They therefore followed a route into India through the Gumal Pass, with an eye set eventually on Gujarat. It was only after suffering a severe defeat at the hands of the Caulukya army of Gujarat that they turned to a more northerly route through the Khyber Pass. The tomb of Ghiyāth al-Dīn, Delhi.

The Turkish conquest: By 1186 the Ghūrids had destroyed the remnants of Ghaznavid power in the northwest and were in a favourable military position to move against the northern Indian Rajput powers. The conquest of the Rajputs was not easy, however. The Cauhans (Cahamanasa) under Prithviraja defeated Muḥammad of Ghūr in 1191 at Taraori, northwest of Delhi, but his forces returned the following year to defeat and kill the Rajput king on the same battlefield. The victory opened the road to Delhi, which was conquered in 1193 but left in the hands of a tributary Hindu king. Muḥammad of Ghūr completed his conquests with the occupation of the military outposts of Hansi, Kuhram, Sursuti, and Sirhind and then returned to Ghazna with a large hoard of treasure, leaving his slave and lieutenant, Quṭb al-Dīn Aybak, in charge of consolidation and further expansion. In the meantime, an obscure adventurer, Ikhtiyār al-Dīn Muḥammad Bakhtiyār Khaljī of the Ghūrid army, conquered Nadia, the capital of the Sena kings of Bengal (1202). Within two years Bakhtiyār embarked on a campaign to conquer Tibet in order to plunder the treasure of its Buddhist monasteries, and in 1206 he attacked Kamarupa (Assam) to gain control of Bengal's traditional trade route leading to Southeast Asian gold and silver mines. The attempt, however, proved disastrous. Bakhtiyār managed to return to Bengal with a few hundred men, and there he died. The availability of a large number of military adventurers from Central Asia who would follow commanders with reputations for success was one of the important elements in the rapid Ghūrid conquest of the major cities and forces of the north Indian plain. Other factors were important as well; better horses contributed to the success of

IGNOURESULTS.COM

mobile tactics, and the Ghūrids also made better use of metal for weapons, armour, and stirrups than did most of their adversaries. Perhaps most important was the tradition of centralized organization and planning, which was conducive to large-scale military campaigns and to the effective organization of postcampaign occupation forces. While the Rajputs probably saw the Ghūrids as an equal force competing for paramount power in north India, the Ghūrids had in mind the model of the successor states to the ʿAbbāsid caliphate, the old Iranian Sāsānid empire, and particularly the vast centralized empire of Maḥmūd of Ghazna. Soon, however, the Ghūrid possessions were insecure everywhere. In 1205 Sultan Muḥammad of Ghūr suffered a severe defeat at Andkhvoy (Andkhui) at the hands of the Khwārezm-Shah dynasty. News of the defeat precipitated a rebellion by some of the sultan's followers in the Punjab, and, although the rebellion was put down, Muḥammad of Ghūr was assassinated at Lahore in 1206. The Ghūrids at the time held the major towns of the Punjab, of Sind, and of much of the Gangetic Plain, but almost all the land outside the cities still was subject to some form of control by Hindu chiefs. Even in the Ganges–Yamuna Doab, the Gahadavalas held out against the Turks. Most significantly, the chiefs of Rajasthan had not been permanently subdued.

The early Turkish sultans: When Quṭb al-Dīn Aybak assumed authority over the Ghūrid possessions in India, he moved from the neighbourhood of Delhi to Lahore. There he set up guard against another of Muḥammad of Ghūr's slaves, Tāj al-Dīn Yildiz of Ghazna, who also claimed his former master's Indian possessions. In 1208 Quṭb al-Dīn defeated his rival and captured Ghazna but soon was driven out again. He died in 1210 in a polo accident, having made no effort to extend his Indian conquests, but he had managed to establish the foundation of an Indian Muslim state.

Frederick M. Asher: Quṭb al-Dīn was the first ruler in what has become known, perhaps unreasonably, as the Slave dynasty (only he actually attained a freed status after becoming ruler). Slavery was, however, an integral part of the political system. As practiced in eastern Muslim polities of this period, the institution of slavery provided a nucleus of well-trained and loyal military followers (the mamlūks) for important political figures; indeed, one of the principal objects of this form of slavery was to train specialists in warfare and government, usually Turks, whose first loyalty would be to their masters. Slave status was honourable and was a principal avenue to wealth and high position for talented individuals whose origins were outside the ruling group. It has been observed that a slave was a better investment than a son, whose claim was not based upon proved efficiency. Yet, slaves with high qualifications could get out of control, and often slaves or former slaves controlled their masters as much as they were controlled by them. The beneficial results for the sultanate of this type of political interaction were that some men of talent had room to rise within the system and thus were less tempted to tear it down and that the responsibilities of government tended to rest in the hands of capable men, whether or not they were the actual rulers. The sultans thus not only kept a close watch over the slave market but also commissioned slave merchants as state agents. Sultan Shams al-Dīn Iltutmish (reigned 1211–36), son-in-law and successor to Aybak, who was himself a mamlūk, sent a merchant to Samarkand, Bukhara, and Tirmiz to purchase young slaves on his behalf.

Consolidation of Turkish rule: During his reign, Iltutmish was faced with three problems: defense of his western frontier, control over the Muslim nobles within India, and subjugation of the many Hindu chiefs who still exercised a large measure of independent rule. His relative success in all three areas gives him claim to the title of founder of the independent Delhi

IGNOURESULTS.COM

sultanate. His reign opened with a factional dispute in which he and his Delhi-based supporters defeated and killed the rival claimant to the throne, Quṭb al-Dīn's son, and put down a revolt by a portion of the Delhi guards. In the west Iltutmish was passive at first and even accepted investiture from his old rival, Yildiz, but, when Yildiz was driven from Ghazna into the Punjab by the Khwārezm-Shah ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad in 1215, Iltutmish was able to defeat and capture him at Taraori. Iltutmish might have faced a threat himself from the Khwārezm-Shah had it not been for the latter's conflict with the Mongol armies of Genghis Khan. Again Iltutmish waited while refugees, including the heir to the Khwārezm-Shahī throne, poured into the Punjab and while Nāṣir al-Dīn Qabācha, another of Muḥammad of Ghūr's former slaves, maintained a perilous hold on Lahore and Multan. Iltutmish's political talents were pushed to the maximum as he tried desperately to avoid a direct confrontation with the armies of Genghis Khan. He refused aid to the Khwārezm-Shah heir against the Mongols and yet would not attempt to capture him. Fortunately, the Mongols were content to send raiding parties no further than the Salt Range (in the northern Punjab region), which Iltutmish wisely ignored, and eventually the Khwārezm-Shah prince fled from India after causing enormous destruction within Qabācha's domains. Thus, Iltutmish's cause was advanced, and in 1228 he was able to drive Qabācha from the Punjabi cities of Multan and Uch and, by establishing his frontier east of the Beas River, to avoid a direct confrontation with the Mongols. He was not able to gain effective control of the western Punjab, however, largely because the area was subject to raids by hill tribes. In the east in 1225, Iltutmish launched a successful campaign against Ghiyāth al-Dīn ʿIwāz Khaljī, one of Bhaktiyār Khaljī's lieutenants, who had assumed sovereign authority in Lakhnauti (northern Bengal) and was encroaching on the province of Bihar. ʿIwāz Khaljī was defeated and slain in 1226, and in 1229 Iltutmish invaded Bengal and slew Balka, the last of the Khaljī chiefs to claim independent power. Iltutmish's campaigns in Rajasthan and central and western India were ultimately less successful, although he temporarily captured Ranthambhor (1226), Mandor (Mandawar; 1227), and Gwalior (1231) and plundered Bhilsa and Ujjain in Malwa (1234–35). His generals suffered defeats, however, at the hands of the Cauhans of Bundi, the Caulukyas of Gujarat, and the Candellas (Chandelas) of Narwar. By 1236, the year Iltutmish died, the Delhi sultanate was established as clearly the largest and most powerful of a number of competing states in north India. Owing to Iltutmish's able leadership, Delhi was no longer subordinate to Ghazna, nor was it to remain simply a frontier outpost; it was to become, rather, a proud centre of Muslim power and culture in India. Iltutmish made clear, however, to what extent Islam and Islamic law (Sharīʿah) could determine the contour of politics and culture in the overwhelmingly non-Muslim Indian environment. Early in his reign, a party of theologians approached him with the plea that the infidel Hindus be forced, in accordance with Islamic law, to accept Islam or face death. On behalf of the sultan, his wazīr (vizier) told the divines that this was impractical, since the Muslims were as few as grains of salt in a dish of food. Despite the Islamic proscription against women rulers, Iltutmish nominated his daughter Raziyyah (Raziyyat al-Dīn) to be his successor. By refusing shelter to the Muslim Jalāl al-Dīn Mingburnu (the last Khwārezm-Shah) against the pagan Genghis Khan, he politely asserted that the Turkish power in Delhi, even though a sequel to a Central Asian social and political struggle, was no longer to involve itself in the power politics of countries of the Islamic East. Iltutmish legitimated his ambition by obtaining a letter of investiture from the ʿAbbāsid caliph in Baghdad, whose name appeared in Hindi on the bullion currency so that the people on the streets might perceive the nature of the new regime. Iltutmish seems to have enjoyed support among his nobles and advisers for his

IGNOURESULTS.COM

assertion that the legal structure of the state in India should not be based strictly on Islamic law. Gradually, a judicious balance between the dictates of Sharīʿah and the needs of the time emerged as a distinctive feature of the Turkish rule. The Muslim constituency, however, could not adjust to the idea of being ruled by a woman, and Raziyyah (reigned 1236–40) fairly quickly succumbed to powerful nobles (the Shamsī), who once had been Iltutmish's slaves. Still, the new state had enough internal momentum to survive severe factional disputes during the 10 years following Iltutmish's death, when four of Iltutmish's children or grandchildren were in turn raised to the throne and deposed. This momentum was maintained largely through the efforts of Iltutmish's personal slaves, who came to be known as the Forty (Chihilgān), a political faction whose membership was characterized by talent and by loyalty to the family of Iltutmish. The political situation had changed by 1246, when Ghiyāth al-Dīn Balban, a junior member of the Forty, had gained enough power to attain a controlling position within the administration of the newest sultan, Nāṣir al-Dīn Maḥmūd (reigned 1246–66). Balban, acting first as nāʾib ("deputy") to the sultan and later as sultan (reigned 1266–87), was the most important political figure of his time. The period was characterized by almost continuous struggles to maintain Delhi's position against the revived power of the Hindu chiefs (principally Rajputs) and by vigilance against the strife-ridden but still dangerous Mongols in the west. Even in the central regions of the state, sultanate rule was sometimes challenged by discontented Muslim nobles. During the first 10 years of Nāṣir al-Dīn Maḥmūd's reign, Balban's campaigns against the Hindu chiefs were only partially successful. By 1266, when he assumed the sultanate, his military strategy was to work outward from the capital. First, he cleared the forests of Mewatis (Mina); then he restored order in the Doab and at Oudh (present-day Ayodhya) and suppressed a revolt in the region of the cities of Badaun and Amroha with particular viciousness. Having established the security of his home territory, Balban then chose to consolidate his rule over the provincial governors rather than to embark upon expeditions against Hindu territories. Thus, he reacted vigorously and effectively against an attempt to establish an independent state in Bengal in the 1280s. Balban sought to raise the prestige of the institution of the sultanate through the use of ceremony, the strict administration of justice, and the formulation of a despotic view of the relationship between ruler and subject. Probably the most significant aspect of his reign was this elevation of the position of the sultan, which made possible the reorganization and strengthening of the army and the imposition of a tighter administrative apparatus. Iltutmish had enforced the centre's control over the nobles in the districts (iqṭāʿs and wilāyahs) by subjecting them to periodic transfers. Balban's government began to investigate what was actually collected and spent within the iqṭāʿ. He appointed a new category of officials, the khwājas, to estimate both the income of the iqṭāʿ holders and the expenses they incurred in maintaining their troops. Any surplus (fawāḍil) was to be remitted to the sultan's treasury. Balban's policy of consolidation, the success of which owed much to the death or incapacity of most of the Forty and to the lack of rival claimants to the throne, strengthened sultanate rule so that his successors could undertake a number of successful expansionist campaigns after 1290.

The Khaljīs: Balban's immediate successors, however, were unable to manage either the administration or the factional conflicts between the old Turkish nobility and the new forces, led by the Khaljīs; after a struggle between the two factions, Jalāl al-Dīn Fīrūz Khaljī assumed the sultanate in 1290. During his short reign (1290–96), Jalāl al-Dīn suppressed a revolt by some of Balban's officers, led an unsuccessful expedition against Ranthambhor, and defeated a substantial Mongol force on the banks of the Sind River in central India. In 1296 he was

IGNOURESULTS.COM

assassinated by his ambitious nephew and successor, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Khaljī (reigned 1296–1316). The Khaljī dynasty was not recognized by the older nobility as coming from pure Turkish stock (although they were Turks), and their rise to power was aided by impatient outsiders, some of them Indian-born Muslims, who might expect to enhance their positions if the hold of the followers of Balban and the Forty were broken. To some extent then, the Khaljī usurpation was a move toward the recognition of a shifting balance of power, attributable both to the developments outside the territory of the Delhi sultanate, in Central Asia and Iran, and to the changes that followed the establishment of Turkish rule in northern India. In large measure, the dislocation in the regions beyond the northwest assured the establishment of an independent Delhi sultanate and its subsequent consolidation. The eastern steppe tribes' movements to the west not only ended the threat to Delhi from the rival Turks in Ghazna and Ghūr but also forced a number of the Central Asian Muslims to migrate to northern India, a land that came to be known as Hindustan. Almost all the high nobles, including the famous Forty in the 13th century, were of Central Asian origin; many of them were slaves purchased from the Central Asian bazaars. The same phenomenon also led to the destabilization of the core of the Turkish mamlūks. With the Mongol plunder of Central Asia and eastern Iran, many more members of the political and religious elite of these regions were thrown into north India, where they were admitted into various levels of the military and administrative cadre by the early Delhi sultans.

Centralization and expansion: During the reign of ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Khaljī, the sultanate briefly assumed the status of an empire. In order to achieve his goals of centralization and expansion, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn needed money, a loyal and reasonably subservient nobility, and an efficient army under his personal control. He had earlier, in 1292, partly solved the problem of money when he conducted a lucrative raid into Bhilsa in central India. Using that success to build his position and a fresh army, he led a brilliant and unauthorized raid on the fabulously wealthy Devagiri (present-day Daulatabad), the capital of the Yadavas, in the Deccan early in 1296. The wealth of Devagiri not only financed his usurpation but provided a good foundation for his state-building plans. ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn already had the support of many of the disaffected Turkish nobles, and now he was able to purchase the support of more with both money and promotion.

Taxation and distribution of revenue resources: Centralization and heavy agrarian taxation were the principal features of ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn's rule. The sultan and his nobles depended in the 13th century largely on tribute extorted from the subjugated local potentates and on plunder from the unpacified areas. The sultanate thus had no stable economic base; the nobles were often in debt for large sums of money to the moneylenders of Delhi. ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Khaljī altered the situation radically, implementing the principles of the iqṭāʿ (revenue district) and the kharāj (land tax) in their classic sense. The iqṭāʿ, formerly loosely used to mean a transferable revenue assignment to a noble, now combined the two functions of collection and distribution of the sultan's claim to the bulk of the surplus agrarian product in the form of kharāj. ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn imposed a land tax set at half the produce (in weight or value) on each individual peasant's holding, regardless of size. It was to be supplemented by a house and cattle tax. The revenue resources so created, divided into iqṭāʿs, or different territorial units, were distributed among the nobles. But the nobles had no absolute control of their iqṭāʿs. They had to submit accounts of their income and expenditure and send the balances to the sultan's treasury. The sultan had prepared an estimate of the produce of each locality by measuring the land. A set of officers in each iqṭāʿ, separate from the assignee, ensured the sultan's control over it. The khāliṣah, the territory whose revenues accrued directly to the sultan's own treasury, was expanded

IGNOURESULTS.COM

significantly, enabling the sultan to pay a much larger number of his soldiers and cavalry troops in cash. Through these measures the sultan struck hard at all the others—his officials and the local rural potentates—who shared economic and political power with him. The magnitude and mechanism of agrarian taxation enabled the sultan to achieve two important objectives: (1) to ensure supplies at low prices to grain carriers and (2) to fill the state granaries with a buffer stock, which, linked with his famous price regulations, came as a solution to the critical financial problem of maintaining a large standing army. Following their occupation of Afghanistan, the Chagatai Mongols began to penetrate well beyond the Punjab, necessitating a comprehensive defense program for the sultanate, including the capital, Delhi, which underwent a two-month siege in 1303. Besides fortifying the capital and supplying the frontier towns and forts with able commanders, marshaling a large army was the task of the hour. Further, the vast expenditure was to be financed by means of the existing resources of the state. ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn planned to compensate for the low cash payments to his soldiers by a policy of market control. The policy enhanced the purchasing power of the soldiers and enabled them to live in tolerable comfort.

Expansion and conquests: The result of ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn's reforms and his energetic rule was that the sultanate expanded rapidly and was subject to a more unified and efficient direction than during any other period. ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn began his expansionist activities with the subjugation of Gujarat in 1299. Next he moved against Rajasthan and then captured Ranthambhor (1301), Chitor (1303), and Mandu (1305), later adding Siwan (1308) and Jalor (1312). The campaigns in Rajasthan opened the road for further raids into south India. These raids were intended to result not in occupation of the land but rather in the formal recognition by Hindu kings of ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn's supremacy and in the collection of huge amounts of tribute and booty, which were used to finance his centralizing activities in the north. ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn's lieutenant Malik Kāfūr again subdued the Yadava kingdom of Devagiri in 1307 and two years later added the Kakatiya kingdom of Telingana. In 1310–11 Malik Kāfūr plundered the Pandya kingdom in the far south, and in 1313 Devagiri was again defeated and finally annexed to the sultanate. ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn also managed to fend off a series of Mongol attacks—at least five during the decade 1297–1306. After 1306 the invasions subsided, probably as much because of an intensification of internal Mongal rivalries as of the lack of their success in India. Ambition, a talent for ruling, and the gold of southern India carried ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn a long way, but it is also significant that he was one of the first rulers to deliberately expand political participation within the sultanate government. Not only did he partly open the gates to power for the non-Turkish Muslim nobility—some of whom were even converted Hindus—but he also at least made gestures toward the inclusion of Hindus within the political world he viewed as legitimate. Both ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn and his son married into the families of important Hindu rulers, and several such rulers were received at court and treated with respect.

The urban economy: The expansion and centralization of the Khaljī sultanate paralleled economic and technological developments of the late 13th and early 14th centuries. Delhi in the 13th century became one of the largest cities in the whole of the Islamic world, and Multan, Lahore, Anhilwara, Kar, Cambay (Khambhat), and Lakhnauti emerged as major urban centres. The repeated Mongol invasions certainly affected the fortunes of some northwestern cities, but on the whole the period was marked by a flourishing urban economy and corresponding expansion in craft production and commerce. Advancements in the textile industry included the introduction of the wooden cotton gin and the spinning wheel and, reportedly, of the treadle loom and sericulture (the raising of silkworms). In construction technology, cementing lime and

IGNOURESULTS.COM

vaulted roofing radically changed the face of the city. The production of paper gave rise to increased record keeping in government offices and to widespread use of bills of exchange (hundis). An expanding trade in textiles and horses provided constant nourishment to the economies of these towns. Bengal and Gujarat were the production centres for both coarse cloths and fine fabrics. Since cavalry came to be the mainstay of the political and military system of the Delhi sultans, horses were imported in large numbers beginning in the early years of the 13th century. Earlier in the 12th century the Hindu kings also kept large standing armies that included cavalry. The Turks, however, had far superior horsemen. Iron stirrups and heavy armour, for both horses and horsemen, came into common use during the period, with significant impact on warfare and military organization. The Battles of Taraori, between Prithviraja III Cauhan and Muḥammad of Ghūr, were mainly engagements of cavalrymen armed with bows and spears; superior Ghūrid tactics were decisive. The Multanis and Khorāsānīs, in the main, controlled the long-distance overland trade. Trade between the coastal ports and northern India was in the hands of Marwaris and Gujaratis, many of whom were Jains. A measure of commercial expansion was the emergence and increasing role of the dallals, or brokers, who acted as middlemen in transactions for which expert knowledge was required, such as the sale of horses, slaves, and cattle. ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Khaljī extended a large loan to the Multanis for bringing goods from afar into Delhi. By the mid-13th century a stable equation between gold and silver was attained, resulting in a coinage impressive in both quality and volume. Northern Indian merchants now benefited from the unification of the Central Asian steppes, which from 1250 until about 1350 (following an initially quite destructive Mongol impact) opened up a new and secure trade route from India to China and the Black Sea. Further, there arose a chain of sea emporia all along the Indian Ocean coast. It was, however, plunder and tribute from Gujarat, the Deccan, eastern and central India, and Rajasthan—combined with regular taxation in the Indo-Gangetic Plain—that sustained the economy and the centralizing regime of Delhi.

IGNOURESULTS.COM